Daily Report

Latin America

FBIS-LAT-94-045
Tuesday
8 March 1994

Daily Report
Latin America

FBIS-LAT-94-045 *8 March 1994*

CONTENTS

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.
An Ω indicates a Foreign Media Note.

CARIBBEAN

Cuba

Castro Comments on Radio Rebelde History *[Havana TV]* 1
Raul Castro Congratulates Canecutters *[Havana TV]* 8
Accord Signed for Infrastructure Construction in Vietnam *[Havana TV]* 9
Article Defines Social Security, Subsidies *[TRABAJADORES 17 Jan]* 9
Jewish Culture, Israeli Trade Reported in Havana *[Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT 11 Feb]* 10

Haiti

Settlement Plan Backed by Employers, CONACOM *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 11
Deputies Meet With Army Staff *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 11
Bazin Offers Full Support *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 12
Port-au-Prince Mayor Proposes Modification *[Madrid EFE]* 12
Merimee on New Government, New Sanctions *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 12
Haitians Demonstrate Outside Aristide-UN Meeting *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 13
U.S. Envoy 'Sensitive,' Optimistic *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 13
U.S. Refuses Ties With 'Any' De Facto Government *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 13
Army Raid Uncovers Weapons Cache in Capital *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 13
Closed Power Station Results in Daily Blackouts *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* 13

MEXICO

Delegation To Reject U.S. Border Practices *[LA JORNADA 7 Mar]* 15
Weekend Shoot-Out Leaves Three Police Dead *[Mexico City Radio]* 15
Governor Questions Report *[Mexico City Radio]* 16
Report on PRI Anniversary, Colosio's Speech *[Mexico City TV]* 16
Magazine Concerned Over Voting Predictions *[LA JORNADA 2 Mar]* 18
Chiapas Indians, Peasants Demand Solution *[Mexico City TV]* 18

CENTRAL AMERICA

Costa Rica

Commentary Welcomes Trade Agreement With Mexico *[San Jose Radio]* 19

Guatemala

Attack on San Juan River Bridge Condemned 19
De Leon Comments *[PRENSA LIBRE 7 Mar]* 19
Army Blames URNG *[Guatemala City TV]* 19
UN Delegates Witness URNG Attack on Quiche Base *[PRENSA LIBRE 5 Mar]* 20

Nicaragua

Chamorro Plays Down Warning on River Dispute *[ACAN]* 20
Borge Views Currents in Sandinism *[BARRICADA 8, 9 Feb]* 20
3-80 Leader Interviewed on RN Integration *[Managua Radio]* 22

Panama

PRD Leader Sees U.S. Plan Against Candidacy *[Hamburg DPA]* 25

SOUTH AMERICA

Argentina

Menem Views Political, Economic Situation *[Madrid ABC 20 Feb]* 26

Bolivia

Vice President Views Gore's Scheduled Visit *[La Paz TV]* 27
Bolivian Labor Group Opposes Participation Bill *[LOS TIEMPOS 22 Feb]* 27
Police Clash With Coca Producers in Chapare Region *[Madrid EFE]* 27
Coca Growers Prevent Eradication of Plantations *[LOS TIEMPOS 20 Feb]* 28

Brazil

Foreign Minister 'Concerned' Over U.S. Trade Law *[GAZETA MERCANTIL 7 Mar]* 28
Says Scheduled Gore Visit 'Very Positive' *[GAZETA MERCANTIL 7 Mar]* 28
Daily Views New U.S. Interest, Kantor's Actions *[O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO 6 Mar]* 29
Editorial Views Short-Term Effects of Super 301 *[O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO 6 Mar]* 29
Daily Views Problems in Talks With IMF *[GAZETA MERCANTIL 2 Mar]* 30
Paper Views Need To Adapt Laws to GATT *[GAZETA MERCANTIL 2 Mar]* 32
Bahia Governor Evaluates Party Alliances *[FOLHA DE SAO PAULO 28 Feb]* 33
Disarray, Conflicts Within PT Ranks Surveyed *[ISTOE 16 Feb]* 34
Correction to President Completes Cabinet Reshuffling 36

Chile

No Decision Yet on Buying Mirage-5 Fighters *[Madrid EFE]* 37
Center Center Union To Merge With National Party *[LA TERCERA DE LA HORA 20 Feb]* 37

Colombia

Polls Show Candidates Samper, Pastrana Tied *[Santa Fe de Bogota TV]* 37
Pastrana Discusses Economic, Narcotics Policy *[EL TIEMPO 13 Feb]* 37
Opposes Oil Sales to Cuba *[Madrid EFE]* 39
Armed Forces Implement Security Plan *[EL TIEMPO 26 Feb]* 39
Irregularities Among Prosecutors Investigated *[EL TIEMPO 23 Jan]* 40
Details of Fabio Ochoa's Confession Reported *[EL TIEMPO 7 Feb]* 40

Paraguay

Colorado Party Appeals Party Elections Results *[ULTIMA HORA 4 Mar]* 42
Correction to Wasmosy State of Nation Address 42

Venezuela

PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Arrives on Visit *[Hamburg DPA]* 42
PRC Visitor Discusses Trade Relations *[Hamburg DPA]* 42

Cuba

Castro Comments on Radio Rebelde History

FL0503012994 Havana Tele Rebelde and Cuba Vision Networks in Spanish 0130 GMT 1 Mar 94

[Colloquy among Cuban President Fidel Castro and Politburo members, Radio Rebelde officials, workers, and retirees at the ceremony commemorating the 36th anniversary of Radio Rebelde at Radio Rebelde's Studio No. 2 in Havana on 24 February—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Castro] This report I had prepared to refresh my memory reads: Radio Rebelde began its broadcasts from Altos de Collantes [words indistinct] on 24 February 1958. On 18 April, following the visit by the commander in chief [words indistinct] address regarding the events of the 9 April rebel strike, the relocation of Radio Rebelde's equipment begins.

That is right. It says here: The relocation begins. What approximate date could it have been?

[Radio Rebelde veteran worker] I believe it was on the 15th.

[Castro] I do not believe it could have been so soon afterwards, because first there were the operations conducted in La Plata and the nearby region as result of the 9 April strike. The troops were very active, were everywhere, conducting assaults everywhere, even the Bayamo-Manzanillo road. When the failure of the April strike became evident, I started out for the station and had to walk a very long distance because to reach La Plata—I do not think I took the Sierra route, but the foothills to reach El Alto de Conrado—it took at least three days. I know I stated that I had walked night and day.

I must have walked a long time. There were all those clashes after 9 April; the long walk to Altos de Conrado must have taken six days and that seems on the short side. I believe the 14th is less likely. The 15th is a better guess. The 18 April date had not caught my attention because it was nine days later. However, we began the relocation right away. [passage omitted]

Following the great blow of the failure of the strike, the enemy had to conduct a forcible, all-out effort to eliminate us. It was their moment of highest enthusiasm, highest morale. It was logical. To me, their offensive was unavoidable.

So I reached the station and reported....[changes thought] They were saying the failure had been total. What really happened on 9 April is that they managed to choke off the strike but we conducted a series of attacks everywhere. We hit them hard in Sierra Maestra and Segundo Frente—where Raul's column had recently arrived. [Words indistinct] we inflicted many casualties and took weapons. In the military arena, we accomplished much although we were only a few. However, they reported that the whole thing was a total disaster. This is what I explained to them. I have here what I said. It is several pages long. I explained everything: what had happened; the extent of the fight; that the Rebel Army was intact and that we would continue resisting. It was a long message. I was hopeful that many people would hear it. I do not know how many might have heard it. I do not know whether the station had many listeners by 14, 15 or 18 April. You probably know. [passage omitted]

[Reading from text] And to the people of Cuba, the assurance that this fortress will never be vanquished and our promise that the fatherland will be free and the struggle will continue to the death of the last man.

This is how that address concluded. Its exact date is not known because no date was recorded. This report cites the 18th as the day the relocation begins. However, I must have spoken very close to the 18th. It is a matter of estimating the time between all that happened on 9 April and the move to where the station was located. [passage omitted]

Then I must really have walked hard. I stayed in that region probably until the 13th. It was on the 13th that we realized that the strike had failed. It must have been the 13th. I said: I have walked night and day without rest from the area of operations of Column No. 1 to keep this appointment with Radio Rebelde. The effort! I must have been in better shape [words indistinct]. Quite a trek. [passage omitted]

In the battle of El Jigue, we adopted the strategy of giving out no news until the fighting was over, because if we issued news the enemy could hear it. Even after the battle was over, we stayed quiet for two or three days in order to remove all the weapons and everything. We delayed the report on the El Jigue battle for about two days. We played many tricks. We tricked them.

I think that because of some small flaws a very good movie about the El Jigue battle was never released. It should still be in the archives somewhere. It was going to be corrected and never was. It is more important that it be released, regardless of mistakes that can always be corrected. We also fooled the enemy there: We fired an initial barrage, then pretended that we had withdrawn. They believed it. [chuckles] They began to organize a caravan to remove the injured or the like and move to the seaside. [Words indistinct] the news, collect the weapons and conduct other operations and, before they could tell, fall on the troops on [words indistinct] Santo Domingo.

[Words indistinct] comrades have collected the historic data. I have a question: Have all the Radio Rebelde archives been preserved? Yes. All the reports, all the news? [passage omitted]

[Noel Perez, former CMKC Radio Oriente/Rebelde manager] [passage omitted] When you arrived in Santiago de Cuba I asked you to address the people, and you, with a tremendous vision, described the situation in the entire island. I was there paying tremendous attention.

You added: Colonel [Ramon] Barquin is in Columbia, and has promoted himself and is conferring appointments on his confidants, too. And in Cabana there are other people. And Camilo [Cienfuegos] has be the only chief in Columbia and in Cabana El Che [Guevara]. As soon as you said that Barquin was in Columbia, we heard: Attention Radio Rebelde CMKC, this is Columbia calling. I answered: This is CMKC Radio Rebelde. The other side said: This is Colonel Barquin; put Fidel Castro on the line immediately. I said: Commander, excuse me. [saluting] I was a soldier from that moment on [laughter]. Fidel said: What is it? I said: Colonel Barquin wants to talk to you. And you said: Tell Barquin I am not here. Tell Barquin I am not here. [repeats]

[Castro] I really do not remember that. I told him: Tell him that in Columbia I will speak only with Camilo.

[Perez] Yes, you added that too.

[Castro] That is what I said. Why would I say: I am not here. I do not want to speak with you. Why in hell would I want to speak with an individual who wanted to shirk the Revolution? I said: Tell him that in Columbia, I will speak only with Camilo.

[Perez] Exactly. And Barquin never called again.

[Castro] Of course not. I remember that Barquin also tried to talk to me in Santiago. I remember that very well. And I said to tell him that in Columbia I will speak only with Camilo. It was logical.

Barquin was taken from Isle of Youth where he was in jail in an effort to save the Army. And because he had some prestige—since he had conspired against Batista—they thought he was the man to be placed there. [passage omitted]

[Castro] [Words indistinct] while we were organizing the offensives by Camilo, Che, by the different columns in different places, because in the meantime we also had to fight a battle against the elections the government was organizing.

In one place there was a period of a certain stability. It was after defeating Batista's last offensive. We were no longer living like nomads, moving from one place to another. And to stay in a given place we had to take precautions because of the bombings that came unexpectedly. We had to establish facilities in the woods. Because we had to be there several weeks, we had to take some initiatives. A hospital was also there in the woods, and other installations. We had to prepare a building for Radio Rebelde, a house for visitors. Some of the installations were made of wood and thatch, but with some protection. It was a good place, there in the woods.

As I said, there were reporters there quite often. An American reporter came and stayed for several days. But we never tell who was a reporter and who was not. We were used to answer every question asked by reporters. But I realized that that man was not interested in anything at all. He was not asking questions. He was not a good journalist, he was just fooling around, playing a role; but he was not a reporter. I said: This is a spy. They sent us a spy. But what are we going to do? We could not hold a trial and execute him just on suspicion. So I said: We have to do something. He was there a week, and I was convinced that Batista had only one alternative, or that he could use only the alternative of trying to kill us all by intensive bombing.

Batista was desperate after his last defeat, and since our columns were moving in all directions... [changes thought] I say columns but in fact the number of rebels were few. When the offensive began in El Jigue we lost approximately 180 men. I sent for Almeida who was near Santiago, and I ordered Raul who was in [name indistinct], and Guillermo, and Camilo who was the last one in El Llano. He was there with only some 30 men. Thus with very few men, some 300 altogether [passage indistinct] Radio Rebelde one of the important things. We decided to occupy the land and not let them pass.

In the beginning we used to ambush them [words indistinct] It was the first time we decided not to let them penetrate. And we prepared a strategy of letting them advance while we were organizing and concentrating ourselves slowly before counterattacking. But apparently those 300 men we had when the offensive began by mid-May [passage indistinct] they had occupied with 900 men. [passage indistinct] while Raul was already in the front hitting some objectives, [passage indistinct] other forces in different directions, one column to Holguin, another to Las Tunas, others to Bayamo, and both Camilo and Che to Villa Clara. All that required some time.

Well, Batista's situation was desperate. He had to try a blow, a massive attack using the Air Force. He could even try an attack with chemical weapons. One day we saw some planes flying and we were happy thinking [words indistinct] that some weapons were sent to us. It was late in the afternoon and some boxes began to fall. They were chemical products dropped in big bottles; they killed some chickens and other animals. It was because the Army had help from a chemist, [words indistinct] and said that the weapon would be effective, but it did not have any effect. That would have been a blow on us. But it would not stop the war. [words indistinct]

When the reporter left, I made some quick mental calculations. Two days had passed since he left and he had probably arrived and tomorrow he would be in a plane showing Batista where we were. Then I told the people: There is a clearing before the forest. And there is a little house there. If you are coming in a plane to hit the command post, you must fix on that little house. So I told the people: We have to get this house out of here tonight. Take it away and plant some trees there. And tomorrow morning no one must be seen anywhere, neither at Rebelde nor anywhere else. We must be at

least one kilometer away. That is the place to be. And everyone was going here and there and asking: But what is this?

[Unidentified speaker] You asked for two volunteers to take care of the documents. And I remained too.

[Castro] That is true. Early in the morning a large number of planes was flying in circles looking for the command post, but they did not find it. They dropped a bomb here and there. So, I played their game. On the second day, the same thing. No one was there. Because in addition to getting rid of the house [words indistinct] because on the third day no one was to move. And on the third day the planes did not come. It was just intuition. [applause] The case of [word indistinct] was even more complicated. There were moments when we had such convictions. [Name indistinct] was pressuring us the day before in his own style, and at that moment a column was leaving. We were lucky. Well, I am not going to tell the whole story, it is a little long. Let us save that story for another time.

Commander, I always wanted to know [words indistinct] undoubtedly it was something very sensitive to set up an antenna in the middle of the war. It was easy for the enemy army to find. [passage indistinct] What I have never been able to find out is how and when did Che sell you the idea of setting up a plant or a station to accompany the army. I know that when you were young you visited many stations and that you liked radio, but when and how did Che convince you of this idea of the radio?

[Castro] We were in the area west of the Turquino. Che's was one of the first columns we formed following the battle on the Ubero [River], and Che moved to that area. We had two positions, two columns: Column I and Che's column. Camilo is over there, with Che. But Che was a bit more stationary.

It was our custom in war to move a lot, incessantly. Sometimes enemy columns were chasing us, and at other times we were chasing them—setting a trap. We set fatal traps against the troops of Batista's army.

But it was a very difficult thing because some of our collaborators, messengers, when taken prisoner—and such was also the case with (Elpiru)—would be promised their lives. They would then collaborate instead of returning, as some did, and explaining; others would remain with (?both).

Thus we set some terrible traps for them, and when against all logic those who were supposed to come in this direction would go in another—it was a strange thing. And it was simply that there was a guide, someone who knew the area, a messenger, one of those people who went back and forth to town, who would give information about our positions.

We would always take such measures that even if the enemy knew more or less where we were, the most that could happen as a consequence was that we would not conduct the strike we had prepared. Neither could they strike us. Our positions were always impregnable, but we were not there long; we would move. That was always our style until we established this camp in November 1958. Che had more stationary habits. There in [word indistinct] we would move a lot. We would come here and cross, and then we would make a long excursion. That was on the one hand.

On the other, he had great initiative to create industries and other things. To establish industries you must be stationary. Sometimes he was attacked on the mesa, including the (Boicito) area. Every so often he had to fight the army there. Of course, he did not have sufficient forces to destroy a column but he was able to defend himself. Then, to do some of the things he wanted to do, he had to remain in one place [words indistinct].

That element was characteristic of him. He had many concerns regarding information. He planed to set up a newsletter similar to the one Maceo had during the war of independence. That is where the idea comes up—it was his idea—to set up the radio station. We were not working at that, because generally the vast majority of our forces were in constant movement. From this side of the Turquino we would sometimes reach near Niquero. From the other side of the Turquino we would sometimes go as far as Guisa. The main column was in constant movement—of course, always setting traps for the enemy, an ambush. We would appear in the place where [words indistinct] we know they were going to try to close our exit routes [words indistinct] prepared. They were going to attack us from behind, but our style of fighting did not include staying in a permanent place. To have a radio station you must have a set location.

When Che created the station, as we said here, I visited it on 9 April. After 9 April we planned the offensive. We already had several things in La Plata. We had a hospital, which needed to be protected. We had a land mine factory that also needed to be guarded. We had reserve ammunition that we would seize from the enemy and we would keep a reserve of bullets. Soldiers use lots of bullets and you must always have a reserve.

Then, once we had the idea of occupying the territory and resisting, the forces that we had were [words indistinct] was that of moving Che to the Mina del Frio so that he could take charge of the new recruits at Mina del Frio. It was an important [words indistinct] that we had in that area. I decided that Guillermo and Ramiro would stay in that area. They did not have the forces necessary to defend that vast territory against a large offensive. Then it seemed better to establish the radio station in the most strategic place and where we had superior forces to defend the hospital, the land mine factory, the reserves and the radio station.

We had already made up our minds that no one would be able to occupy that territory. That is when we decided to

move, prior to Batista's offensive, the radio station. But it was Che's idea to start a radio station.

It was he who conducted all negotiations and who carried them out, since he had a stable base. He used different types of squabbles with the Army before an attack. But the station could be set because we were planning to remain in an area with necessary forces so that the enemy would not take it over. This was when the decision had been made to move the radio station there, our most solid base.

We must add that the radio station played a role much importance than what we initially imagined. But as I was saying it was necessary to note that the station became not only an information medium, a source of information of what was happening then, but an instrument of war. It became the main means of communications between us and the rest of the country and with the other columns that were operating, such as Raul's column. It becomes the center of international communications with the movement; it became a psychological weapon. The small station in operation showed the enemy's inability to destroy it. It became the center for slogans and revolutionary guidance for the troops and for the people in general. As was just demonstrated by what the comrade from the Santiago de Cuba CMKC station said.

Radio Rebelde became everything. And I would say that at that time it was almost the revolutions's main weapon. Radio Rebelde from the very beginning has been characterized by a principle which was unfailingly implemented. It was similar to the policy we had with the prisoners and with the enemy. We had a policy concerning information. Over Radio Rebelde one was not allowed to tell, nor did anyone ever tell, a single lie. This was a key thing. Never did Radio Rebelde add a single bullet to the numbers reported. Never did Radio Rebelde report a single casualty less than the true number—of our own casualties, I mean—nor ever report a single enemy dead or wounded, more than the actual number. Nor a single rifle more. I can sum it up like this: Not even a single bullet was ever added to the true figure. If 581 rounds were captured, we did not say either 582 or 700 rounds or 1,000 rounds. We would say 581 rounds. Not a single bullet more than what was calculated. We were strictly exact in our information without any exception whatsoever. We also had a rigorous policy without exception concerning prisoners, and about tending to the wounded.

Just to have an idea of the last offensive, and the quality of our medics in the war, there is a report that says that of 117 wounded soldiers, only two died. I am referring to enemy soldiers. We saved the lives of 115 enemy soldiers with our medicines. So we had a policy with our enemies that was the same throughout the war. It was very effective because they had more confidence in us than in their leaders. They believed in what we said. And I think Radio Rebelde's credibility was something extraordinary, because all our comrades who were elsewhere, and who had their own radio stations—or if they did not have one, they did have a radio to monitor Radio Rebelde—they knew what was happening. If they wanted to send a message somewhere, it was sufficient to listen to Radio Rebelde and they knew it was a message for all, what happened and how it happened, how many casualties were inflicted on the enemy, how many weapons were seized, how many casualties we had, everything was reported. [Words indistinct] once the comrades reached other sites the set up other stations. The Second Front only set up about 10 or 12, or more stations. You must know how many. Everywhere they could they set up a station. By the end, when they were added up we came up with almost 40 stations. [Words indistinct] every column, we have to keep in mind that every column [words indistinct].

[Words indistinct] because of the same war doctrine was the same from the same war school, the same ideas. It was a very important factor in our revolutionary war. There were not 20 different schools of war, but a single school of war, and from there, everyone added his own piece of an idea, creativity, initiatives, etc. And of course the idea of a radio station was generalized among all forces of the Revolution. We understood the importance of the role played by a radio station in due time. Evidence of this is the lengthy walk to the station to talk after the strike. It was necessary to have a mass communications system with the people and we were in a position to do so because we had to have a sound territory. And that is why we supported Che's idea. It was exclusively Che's idea. This is one of the many initiatives he had, such as the newspaper, the radio station, the shoe industry, local industries, and others.

[Unidentified speaker] I understand that there was an idea [words indistinct] that you also proposed a musical program within the radio station programming. I know you are a good politician but [words indistinct].

[Castro] We used to have the Rebel Quintet, which was created there. It was famous. But we used music in some battles too. Our battles were psychological. If you examine [words indistinct] to give our war of liberation as an example, the use of psychological warfare during that war.

At 0300 we did not allow the enemy soldiers to sleep. We figured out ways to keep them awake. We had a (?.50-) caliber machine gun. We did not have many bullets, but at 0200, pum, pum, pum, three shots. We did not have many 30.06-caliber bullets, but we did have many 9 mm bullets that were used in a Beretta machine gun.

Was it a Beretta, that machine gun? No. It was a smaller, 9 mm machine gun. I do not remember the caliber of that Beretta.

Well, it was not a Beretta, but it was a 9 mm machine gun. That machine gun was used all around the front. It fired more rounds.

Some three shots were fired here, another three over there, another three there, etc. However, the rest of the soldiers were absolutely forbidden to fire a single shot.

Only if the enemy came out of their trenches would they fire. The rebels did not have permission to fire, because they might run out of bullets and the war would be over [laughter]. That was the principle.

Automatic weapons were feared. I have certain papers—certain papers, because the papers do not include certain tough messages. We used highly expressive words. [laughter] There is a dear friend—we do not want to mention his name—who said that he fired an entire ammunition belt of a .30-caliber machine gun in an attack against [Colonel Sanchez] Mosquera. I am going to say his name: Guillermo. That (?was bad), but Guillermo fought hard agains: Mosquera with a weapon of such caliber [words indistinct] during the first battles of the offensive—because in the beginning, rather ambitiously, they attacked with a brigade from this side of the Turquino and another brigade from the other side, where we were. We were in the western part, and they attacked from the east and west. At a given moment they gathered all forces toward the west, where Radio Rebelde was located, and all of us. They kept attacking Guillermo and Ramirez. Guillermo had a .30-caliber machine gun holding back such an attack. Then he said he had used up an entire belt of .30-caliber machine gun ammunition. And I sent an order to them: People who use an entire ammunition belt and boast about it deserve to be executed. [laughter].

That was Guillermo. He used an entire ammunition belt because Mosquera had extremely aggressive troops, because every so often they smoked their marijuana cigarettes. Marijuana was easily available. But I never heard a case of a rebel smoking marijuana. However, the soldiers once discovered that people were planting marijuana among the coffee trees. We did not even know what it looked like. Toward the end we did, when someone would say: Here is a marijuana plant. It was a beautiful, growing tree among the coffee plants.

We economized on bullets in an strict manner; we wanted to keep the enemy awake and we had to count the bullets. Firing was forbidden, except under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, we had to keep the shooting going so that they could not sleep. By the time we had the troops surrounded they were sleep-deprived. [Words indistinct] because at 2300, when you start sleeping, three .50-caliber [as heard] bullets whistle by and you lose sleep. And we used to do this every night.

Every so often we used to bring in the Rebel Quintet, a concert for the soldiers. We used to tell them that the support troops had been killed, that we had seized the mail sent to them, [words indistinct]. The soldiers received letters from their relatives through us, because we would capture a company and read them the news. Besides, we used not only the machine gun bursts but music as well. We did this to relax and demoralize them [laughter], although we also played music as part of Radio Rebelde's broadcasts, to make its programing livelier and more attractive. [passage indistinct] I think the members of the Rebel Quintet are still alive.

[Unidentified speaker] Yes, they are still around. The old man died, but the boys are still alive. His sons are also musicians.

[Castro] [Words indistinct] the music was part of the programing but they were used in the battles as well. The loudspeakers did not stop operating, because [words indistinct]. You should have seen how those loud speakers could be heard in those valleys [words indistinct].

[Eugenio Barrido] Commander, I have heard it said often that radio was persuasive, that it reached the people. But there was a moment in the hills when you considered Radio Rebelde a strategic element, especially for the command. You even compared it with the hospital or other installations. What was the main factor that caused you, or the Revolution's leadership, to consider Radio Rebelde positively, as a strategic point in the struggle? Did you place greater emphasis on the military aspect or on the political aspect?

[Castro] On the political aspect. As far as we were concerned, the political and military aspects were closely linked. If you did not win the political war you could not win the military war. With the few men we had we could not win a war, not unless you had the support of all the people.

It is true that our soldiers were very effective, although they did not have the opportunity to take intensive courses, and although their weapons were not modern. Few times have I seen a war fought with such tremendous effectiveness, as by those men. Let me just tell you that we did not have a single weapon lost on the front line. All weapons were counted—heavy weapons I mean, because there were some who had shotguns while others had pistols, which are of relative value. We are talking about heavy weapons. And according to my calculations, I can give you these figures: We had 300, and then 900. I believe we had some 3,000 men and no more, according to rough estimates. This was the total number of armed men by the end of the war, men armed with heavy weapons. There were a few collaborators, but not many. But as regards heavy weapons, by the end of the war we had some 3,000 weapons, more than 90 percent of them seized from the enemy.

I can say the same as regards bullets. That is, there were no extra rifles, besides those being used on the front. For this reason, we can say that the performance of each weapon was high. One hundred percent of the weapons were in the battlefield. It was a highly efficient war, especially for us, because Batista had 80,000 men: policemen, soldiers, sailors.

The balance of forces at its best was 30 soldiers to one, in Batista's favor. There was a moment when there were 10,000 Batista soldiers to each of ours, when we were some six or seven people. Well, that was the figure in the beginning [words indistinct] up to 100. The number of our soldiers increased vigorously as of May, after the last offensive. After that offensive came the Second Front

offensive, when many weapons were also seized. But with such a correlation of forces, we could not hope to defeat the Army without the support of the population. The people had to play their role in the general strike.

And it was too late for the idea of a general strike. Our idea was to take over the Moncada Barracks, seize Santiago de Cuba, and then call the entire population to a general strike. Moncada was our first thought.

The April strike was also an attempt to overthrow the regime by means of a general strike. I knew that this was a delicate issue, because there were many ideas among us. Within our own movement there were people who saw us as elements of agitation in the mountains; elements who would, at a given moment, create either a general strike or a social explosion, and who would eliminate the regime. And there were also those who thought that the idea was to create a false situation to effect a coup d'etat.

We had different lines of thought within our own movement, different ideas. Our idea was to take over the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba, where there were thousands of weapons. And if our strategy were to fail and we could not defeat the government, we would retreat to the mountains with those thousands of weapons. Imagine us retreating with thousands of weapons toward the Sierra Maestra, how much it would have shortened the struggle, even if the regime was not defeated then.

There was also the idea of a guerrilla movement if the regime was not defeated. The idea included a small army growing strong to the point of being capable of defeating the enemy Army—but with the help of the people, of course.

But all through the struggle in Sierra Maestra, we had to avert as many coups d'etat as were conceived. We used to say that if a coup d'etat occurred, the war would continue. That was our idea. But at a given moment, we already had sufficient forces to resort to the strike. The strike staged in April was premature. And it was not from our initiative in the Sierra Maestra. It was an initiative of the [26 July] Movement in the plains. We must say that the April strike was imposed on us. Of course, we accepted it and were equally responsible for the April strike. But we did not yet have sufficient military forces with which to support a general strike.

There was a meeting of the movement, and the movement's board said: Well, we were up in the mountains and could not very well see the situation on the plains; there were subjective factors, and for this reason... [changes thought] We were there... [changes thought] They were talking about peace. Yes, we accepted peace; we would not reject it. But we demanded a condition—that the eastern provinces be handed over to us with all their weapons. We were willing to hold elections [words indistinct], but hand over the eastern provinces and all their weapons. That is, our conditions were impossible that could affect the enemy [as heard].

We did not reject any peace proposal, although we did have a very clear idea of the Revolution. And to make a revolution, we had to have the people. We were very clear on this. The April strike failed, and the revolutionary forces, the fighters were left alone. Thus, the revolutionary morale collapsed throughout the country. That lasted four months until we destroyed Batista's offensive. That is, the rebel army destroyed Batista's offensive and raised morale, creating new conditions for victory.

By the end of December, Batista had already lost the war because when the coup d'etat took place, there were approximately 17,000 soldiers, according to my calculations then, and there might have been more, some 17,000 soldiers besieged in the eastern region. The island was divided into two parts by the columns of Che and Camilo. He could no longer be saved militarily. But the danger of a coup prevailed. We had foreseen this because it did happen more than once in Cuban history. A coup d'etat that deceived the people, making them believe that all problems had vanished. That is history. America's history is filled with such examples. When there is a tough struggle by the people, a coup takes place and everyone is happy and celebrating. But what happens is that new figures replace the others. There is no revolution. All through the war, through Radio Rebelde in the final stages, we were trying to convince the people to reject the coup. Because we were not going to accept any coup d'etat. If there was a coup, the war would continue. That was our policy.

Then finally, what we were going to do on 26 July in Moncada, we did on 1 January 1959. It was precisely the same idea. And the whole country was paralyzed. The country's total paralysis helped demoralize the rest of the country. They were no longer willing to fight. The story of that comrade at 1000 in the morning, that henchman—Despaine—still had steam left. He was ready to kill. They were killing people even the day before. But the demoralization had become generalized at that moment. Otherwise, they would have attacked the station. He fired some shots there, but after all, he failed to seize the station that could have been taken with a revolver. No one was defending the station. He sent a burst of fire, and sent someone else over. They were demoralized. And the general strike defeated them completely. It demoralized them completely in such a manner that not a single shot more was fired. The rebel columns disarmed the Army during the first days of May. There were few who joined us, but you know this history and its impact. We ought to tell things as they were, including the meeting I held with the Army in Bayamo, where we took [words indistinct] you see around.

There I met with approximately 2,000 soldiers who had been fighting a tough battle with us until a few days earlier. They were the elite forces. I was alone there with them. This had already happened to me during the Jigue battle. We had disarmed the Army and I was anxious to see the weapons we were to seize, so in the middle of the negotiations, I sneaked in at night, but they recognized me. And there I was in the middle of all those soldiers who were still armed, but remained calm as if nothing

had happened. We kept talking with [words indistinct] the agreements we have reached, but it was there in Bayamo, because the troops were absolutely demoralized. A defeated troop is a demoralized one.

I met with the Bayamo Army in a stadium. Well, they were still enthusiastic because they did not know what was going on in Havana. There was nothing definite about the operation that was to be carried out by that man we just mentioned....

[Unidentified speaker, interrupting] Barquin [as heard].

[Castro] Yes, Barquin. Well, we added things up. I was bringing 1,000 rebel soldiers from the east and 2,000 enemy soldiers who had joined us [Casquitos]; 2,000 soldiers with tanks. We did not know anything about those Sherman tanks, nor did we know how to operate the artillery, but we already had the auxiliary troops who [words indistinct] just in case.

It was a political battle. That is, politics. Such politics reached even the enemy line. We were respected because they knew we did not mistreat prisoners. We did not beat or humiliate prisoners. We did not murder any prisoner. Besides, there was a case when a soldier surrendered; there was a war criminal among the troops, who had committed crimes; but we assured them that they would not be sentenced to capital punishment. Of course this was limited to only one or two of those well-known henchmen who had killed several people but were also given guarantees. The soldiers were set free and the officers were allowed to keep their service weapons.

This policy that our army adopted was extremely valuable because in the beginning no soldier would surrender. They were told we would kill them because they were told the great lie that in Moncada, soldiers were beheaded in the hospital. That is what they said about us when the Moncada was attacked. It is true that there were some incidents at the hospital because some people mistook the buildings and ended up entering the hospital. I went to the hospital and released them. I think there one person was wounded, a janitor who climbed up on a window. But they spread the story that we had cut the throats of the sick in the hospital. And that propaganda had had an impact on the soldiers. No soldiers were surrendering. But when the soldiers began to realize that when they are made prisoners they were set free, that they were respected, they began to surrender. There were soldiers who surrendered three times. They surrendered to us here in Sierra Maestra, from which they were sent to Las Villas; and there when surrounded, they surrendered again, but much more quickly. They knew that we were only interested in their weapons and ammunition. The soldier [words indistinct] that policy, that policy used with the people, the credibility of the station, of never telling a lie. But more important yet was the policy with the people, because with very few men we could not win the war against that large army which did have some training, and good weapons, and which above all, had an air force with which they strafed us continuously. You know what a war is like when the enemy has aircraft, an air force, artillery, and tanks, and you have only rifles and land mines. We won the war with rifles and mines. But of course, we had the soul of the country, the spirit of the country, the support of the people, which was decisive in winning that war.

Radio Rebelde's political factor was also very important, but the political factor was not and could not be isolated from the military factor. It was symbiosis. Thus, Radio Rebelde played a decisive role. Not only that, but all the other factors I mentioned here. [passage omitted]

Unfortunately I no longer have the collaborator's job I used to have [words indistinct] [laughs] nor can I be up-to-date anymore and as close to the work you do. I hear some general opinions on Radio Rebelde's work, and also some opinions on the innovations you have been introducing, but not because I am personally close to the station. Unfortunately, I am always busy with something, and if I am not doing something, I am reading. I have had to rely very much on books because one learns a great deal from them. I often want to watch the television newscasts, for instance, but I can rarely watch it. Sometimes I listen to a three-minute summary of news of what has happened over the weekend. I often have meetings, commitments at all hours. For this reason, I also read the press very quickly. You know that there are very few newspapers. Since there is a paper shortage I can do so. I have very little time, few minutes to dedicate to radio. But I do read many dispatches. I read many reports to learn what is going on in the world, and it takes time.

I do not spend much time on radio. I would like to tell you that I spend one hour a day listening to radio. I am even willing to pledge to listen in, not for an hour, but for at least 10 minutes a day. But I do have some very clear and precise ideas on the role played not only by Radio Rebelde, but by radio in general.

I think we must see all radio, throughout the country, as a great Radio Rebelde. We must see radio as in the final stage of the war when we had radio stations everywhere, all cooperating among themselves, helping one another, joining a network, which played an essential role.

I think there is nothing comparable to radio, for very clear and objective reasons. First, because we lack paper. Dozens and dozens of publications had to be suspended. Almost all newspapers had to be turned into weeklies because of the lack of paper necessary for daily publications. Many magazines have vanished; others have reduced their editions. So, the printed press has lost many resources, and they are costly resources. To maintain the level of a press media, a large amount of printing paper would be necessary, and there are no resources to import them. And I think for a long period of time yet, we will not have the necessary resources [words indistinct] the press.

With television, we have lost a large number of broadcast hours. Television is aired in the afternoon for a few hours, usually after 1900, and only for a few hours, due to problems with electric power and resources. Television also had to considerably reduce its resources to report on events.

All these media, both radio and television, have great potential. I think television is a [word indistinct] power to influence events. We do still have radio, which broadcasts many [words indistinct]. There are radio stations everywhere—in all provinces, all municipalities, and its cost is much lower. It is perfectly feasible for Cuba to maintain the radio network. It was, has been, and will be an important means of communication because I see very clearly the decisive role it plays.

I could compare this moment of the special period, this political moment Cuba is facing, with those days of fighting in Sierra Maestra, with those days of 1958 we have been mentioning. The difference is that this period is more prolonged. I would say that this period is more difficult than that one. It requires more effort, more talent, more commitment. The work is done under complex conditions today, particularly following the hard blows the national economy has experienced. Only as a miracle of human will can the country's resistance be explained.

Now I see radio in general—I am not referring to Radio Rebelde alone—as a great rebel radio, in a period similar to that one, in a very difficult and decisive moment, when the radio plays the role of a weapon, a decisive weapon in this difficult battle, an even more difficult battle. I would say that this battle is even more noble than that battle.

At that time we were confronting a local tyrant supported by imperialism, while today we are confronting head-on an imperialism that employs every resource in an effort to destroy us. Today when the socialist bloc no longer exists, I think we are fighting a war much greater and more noble than the one waged then: a political and ideological battle, a battle that is not entirely separate from the military strength of the Revolution because to the extent that the ideas grow stronger, and to the extent that morale is high, we will also be militarily stronger. Although my schedule does not allow me to be closer to the radio, I promise to be more interested in the way you are working.

I talk to many people and they inform me, they tell me the news they hear in the morning. Most of the news that is told to me is news that people hear on the radio.

So I give to radio the same importance given to Radio Rebelde in the most difficult and decisive moments of our war of liberation. I hope the workers, the reporters, all those who work in radio will be aware of this and will be at the level of Radio Rebelde back then.

Someday, new generations will meet here again; the younger ones and some of the older ones will meet here again. They will meet to recall the important role played by radio during these difficult days of the special period. [applause] [passage omitted]

I have always liked radio. Even in my youth I used the radio in the political struggle. I had a radio [words indistinct]. It forced me to work hard. I worked hard with journalists. [Words indistinct] the newspaper with the highest readership back then. [Words indistinct] four times a week and I had extensive articles ready. [Words indistinct] wanted to evict the neighbors. [Words indistinct] I researched all the businesses the government had created, land it had purchased cheaply, projects in which it had invested, and how it had made a million pesos. I researched the property records [words indistinct] and I would report this in the newspaper and over radio. A radio station creates an awareness among its listeners; it becomes a power. [Words indistinct] The neighbors became [words indistinct]. I have never told this before. This was due to... [changes thought] I joined them, managed the mail [words indistinct]. It was always a voice denouncing the corruption, theft, when [words indistinct]. Then I used it [words indistinct]. [passage indistinct] We do not have to go to Guatemala. All their businesses were there. The notary and property records, the prices; I published all this. [Words indistinct]. I had just graduated. I was not very experienced as a lawyer but I had the energy to spend hours doing research. I used to go and find the data for the newspaper and always was saying: We do not have to go to Guatemala. Of course, he charged that someone had given him the information, but could not prove it. He was harshly attacked. After his death there was no one to follow him. A bit of that emptiness [words indistinct] to work, speak seriously. [Words indistinct] near Maceo Street and President Avenue, no. 1600? [passage omitted]

On the fifth floor of a tall building. I had to run to arrive on time. [words indistinct] Everything since was mortgaged because they charged me a [words indistinct]. They did not pay me for that. I gave great propaganda to the station, increased its ratings, and had to pay. It was only 15 minutes of very hard work. Radio work is hard. It was a fixed schedule. You had to make it on time and have all your information together. I had that experience in radio, and also in journalism. I am not familiar with television work.

I have to take full advantage of the few hour I have available. [Words indistinct]. Our greatest weapon is radio. [passage omitted]

Raul Castro Congratulates Canecutters

FL0403145794 Havana Cuba Vision Network in Spanish 0100 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] Army General Raul Castro, second secretary of the Central Committee and minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces [FAR], has sent a congratulatory message to 60 canecutting brigades that have already cut the millionth arroba of sugarcane in honor of the 29th

anniversary of the establishment of the Millionaire movement, which is being celebrated today, 3 March.

The brigades are made up of volunteers from the Cuban Workers Federation [CTC], regular workers, members of the National Association of Small Farmers [ANAP], and Youth Labor Army [EJT] troops from 11 Cuban provinces—Santiago de Cuba, with 20 work groups, being the most oustanding.

The message from Raul states: Upon learning that you have reached the first million arrobas of sugarcane, I felt inspired to express my sincere congratulations. I know this is an achievement you repeat in every sugar harvest, but this year and the next have a special and historic value.

Raul's message goes on to say that 30 years ago, in 1964, two cane-cutting brigades set themselves the goal of cutting no fewer than 1 million arrobas of sugarcane during the next harvest. That was on 15 June 1964 at the Emilio Lesmes farm in Contramaestre.

Raul goes on to say: I had the privilege of participating in that memorable assembly. I understood the unprecedented and elevated goal that those work groups of fervent revolutionaries had set, and I encouraged them to make the effort to reach it.

Raul continues: This idea expressing the new attitude vis-a-vis the work done by the canecutters, now owners of the cane and the sugar, organized in brigades and freed from the hard labor of cutting by hand thanks to new machinery, caught on in the rest of the country. Thus, in March 1965 the Julio Antonio Mella Brigade from Havana Province completed the first million arrobas, followed by two brigades from Matanzas.

Raul says, further: On 3 March, our commander in chief presented those brigades with the first Millionaire banners bearing the image of Jesus Menendez. That year, attaining their goal, more than 100 eastern brigades reached the one-million-arroba mark.

In other words, in 1994 we celebrate the 30th anniversary of the the launching of the one-million-arroba movement, and in 1995 we will celebrate the 30th anniversary of the founding of this movement. You are the worthy heirs of those forerunners.

In the last paragraph of his message to the canecutters, Castro says: I hope we will remember both events in a revolutionary way: making the current harvest more efficient, working hard today and tomorrow toward the recovery of the cane crops, the planting campaign, and the weeding campaign—all this aimed at obtaining a superior harvest in 1995.

Raul concludes his letter by sending a brotherly embrace to all canecutters.

Accord Signed for Infrastructure Construction in Vietnam

FL0703155294 Havana Cuba Vision Network in Spanish 0100 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Excerpt] Representatives from the Ministries of Construction of Vietnam and Cuba have signed a cooperation agreement in Havana. The document establishes that Cuban and Vietnamese construction forces will work on infrastructure projects in Vietnam. The Vietnamese delegation is headed by Professor (Nguyen Manh Kin), vice minister of construction.

[Begin (Nguyen Manh Kin) recording, in Vietnamese with superimposed translation into Spanish] This will be a multinational enterprise between Cuba and Vietnam. They will carry out construction work in Vietnamese territory. In the future, they will also be able to do more work in other countries in that region. [end recording]

The Vietnamese delegation also held a meeting with Politburo member Carlos Lage and Commander of the Revolution Ramiro Valdes. During the meeting, the experience of Cuban construction workers in building projects abroad was highlighted. [passage omitted]

Article Defines Social Security, Subsidies

94CA0073A Havana TRABAJADORES in Spanish 17 Jan 94 p 8

[Article by Caridad Lafita Navarro—For related reporting on this issue see FBIS-LAT-94-011]

[Text] Is there a proposal to eliminate subsidies when a worker gets sick? Hesitantly, a reader asked me this question last Tuesday, conveying her coworker's concern to me.

I think that in the process arranged by the CTC [Cuban Workers Federation] for workers to discuss and offer their ideas for solutions to ease the nation's present financial situation, some i's need to be dotted. One of these is precisely the issue of subsidies.

Recently, and not just in my conversation with Josefa, but also in comments overheard while waiting in lines, on buses, and in some workplaces, I have found signs of confusion between the subsidies granted to enterprises and social security subsidies.

For the sake of clarity, and without going too deeply into the issue, I think we should clarify the differences between the two concepts.

Subsidies To Cover Losses

Subsidies to cover losses are financial resources from the state budget. They are granted to state enterprises to defray operating losses and to offset reduced prices.

In his speech to the National Assembly of the People's Government, Jose Luis Rodriguez, minister-chairman of the State Committee for Finance, said that subsidies to

cover losses in which the consequences of the adverse economic situation are factors—by creating substantial declines in efficiency and productivity—have risen more than projected, reaching 4.6 billion pesos in 1993, 73 percent more than in 1989.

This impacts heavily on the budget which has a deficit, that is, an imbalance between income and spending, which must be covered.

We have products that need to be subsidized, as their production cost is high, so that the population can obtain them at a minimum and affordable price. Milk is an example of this; it sells at 25 centavos per liter, while its actual cost is much higher.

Social Security Subsidies

Subsidies for social security purposes are another matter.

They are defined as monetary compensation granted until a worker's recovery or rehabilitation when he or she is unable to work due to ordinary illnesses and accidents and job-related illnesses or accidents. The absence is either temporary or partial in nature.

For each type of cause the magnitude of the subsidy ranges between 50 and 90 percent of the worker's average daily salary.

These subsidies come from social security funds, and have become a major drain on the budget.

Last year Cuba spent somewhat over 1.6 billion pesos for social security, the highest figure ever.

It is true that some illnesses have appeared, like optic neuritis, causing numerous workers to receive appropriate medical treatment and rest.

But there have also been abuses concealed by some doctors' complacency and kindness, allowing people to get subsidies and time off work that they did not need. By not producing or providing any service, nothing was given in exchange, and that burdened our social funds even more heavily.

The final point is, in my view, the most disturbing factor about compensation for illnesses or accidents: that we may lose control of their use and drain the already overloaded social protection system. We need to keep these costs within reasonable and necessary limits, for it would be an abuse and negligence, especially now, to waste what we have for situations that are difficult for anyone.

But it needs to be made quite clear, both to Josefa and her coworker and other people as well, that there will be no elimination of social security subsidies here. This guarantee arises from the human essence of our socialist system. It was an old aspiration of generations of workers and was made a reality by the revolution.

Jewish Culture, Israeli Trade Reported in Havana

94CA0074A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Weekend Supplement) in Hebrew 11 Feb 94 p 18-19

[Article by correspondent Tzaduq Yehezgali in Havana]

[Text] [Excerpt] [passage omitted] There are about 200 children and young people in Cuba today who can speak a little Hebrew, have mastered the basic concepts of Judaism, are active in a Zionist youth group, and dream of really making Aliyah to Israel, in contrast to their elders, who see Israel as a stopping-point on the way to America. When we asked one of the community leaders this week how many would leave if the gates to Israel were opened, he hesitated a little and then said "about 400 people." "And how many want to go to Miami?" This time, he did not hesitate even for a moment: "98 percent."

You could see the lightning in their eyes this week, when they came to meet the guests from Israel, and especially the chief rabbi, the most senior personage from Israel to arrive on an official visit to Cuba since relations were severed. They danced Israeli folk dances, knew by heart every word of the half-dozen Hebrew songs they had learned. There was not one young person without a Star of David around his neck.

"Here, together, we can forget our everyday problems," says Alberto Sus, the young Cuban who leads the Jewish youth group. The 40 youngsters go on hikes, have parties and Sabbath eve services, and fantasize about life in Israel. Nobody can allow himself the luxury of a cafe or discotheque, which are meant almost entirely for tourists, but who thinks about going out on the town—Sus told us that, "there are nights when I go to bed hungry."

But really, the situation of this Jewish young man is really better in many ways than that of others the same age in Cuba. If there is discrimination here, the ones most deprived are the 11 million Cubans, not the 1,600 Jews. That is the reason the leaders of the Jewish community are beginning to suspect that people not Jewish in any way are suddenly declaring themselves Jews simply because it is convenient.

"What worries me," said the Communist party's official responsible for religions, Caridad Diego, "is that with all the foreign aid to the Jewish community, a privileged class may be created here." We talked in the meeting hall filled with gifts from heads of states and party leaders from all over the world. On the wall was a gilded map of Palestine, a gift from Arafat, with not a single Israeli city marked on it. Diego spoke of the fear of hostility toward Jews on the side of Cubans who are not lucky enough to get aid from overseas.

The situation is truly hard. There are hardly any shops in the streets of Havana. Occasionally you see an old Chevrolet from the prerevolutionary days, or a Russian

"Lada," and you see many, many bicycles. Those who cannot even get one of these, drag their feet around the streets of the city.

Without the Russians, there are no subsidies and no fuel. Without fuel, there is no electricity, sometimes for most of the hours of the day and night. Without electricity, factories are closed. This domino has destroyed what the revolution built, and what Castro does have to give the Cubans are sayings written in the colors of the Cuban flag on every free wall: slogans like "Cuba together," or "We will win." But what do the Cubans say? "You don't go to the market with slogans."

Israel does not have diplomatic relations with Cuba. But in the economic realm, the Israelis have already put a foot on this Caribbean island.

There are at least half a dozen Israelis doing business here, including former adviser to the prime minister on security matters, Rafi Eitan.

The most thriving project is that of an Israeli investment group that grows oranges here for export. Israelis living in Panama import a line of products from Cuba, utilizing the cheap workforce and the government incentives.

In the black market, it is easy to get products like Maccabee beer or Telma soup nuts, imported by an Israeli businessman who lives here.

The Cubans, who are looking for every investor they can get, are ready to overlook the symbol of the State of Israel on the passport. "We know the Israelis are here," a senior official in the Cuban foreign trade ministry told us this week. "We would not be against seeing more. We need investors."

Haiti

Settlement Plan Backed by Employers, CONACOM

FL0703190494 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1145 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] They are all for the Washington plan except the people's organizations, perhaps those very close to the president in exile. The political crisis settlement plan that arose from the Washington negotiations and was approved by a majority of deputies in a parliamentary session on 2 March seems to be gathering a maximum of support. The Haitian employer sector also is backing the document for which CONACOM [National Congress Of Democratic Movements], a party close to the president in exile, also gave its support to the parliament. The other political parties are still waiting and have refrained from taking a stand on what the U.S. Embassy spokesman in Port-au-Prince sees as a step toward the exit door in this long, Haitian crisis.

Deputies Meet With Army Staff

FL0703190594 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1145 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Excerpts] Following the vote by the deputies approving a settlement plan for the political crisis, the Senate of the Republic will soon be called to take a stand on the document. Meanwhile, questions are being posed regarding the position of the military whose chief, General Cedras, must go into retirement according to the fifth point of the plan elaborated in Washington by the legislators. Edner Jean tried to question deputies who met with the members of the Army General Staff on the eve of the vote on the plan to resolve the crisis:

[Begin Jean recording] The parliamentary delegation sponsoring the settlement plan for the crisis met on 1 March with the Army General Staff for a three-hour meeting. The objective was to submit the plan to the approval of the military through the commander in chief, a signatory to the Governors Island accord.

According to a generally reliable source, the discussions were very keen. The Army General Staff allegedly reproached the parliamentary delegation for having involved the military institution in a plan without its previous agreement. The members of the General Staff, still according to the same source, allegedly told the deputies clearly that they could not foresee the consequences of this plan.

To ascertain the truth of those reports, we questioned the members of the parliamentary delegation. Duly Brutus, one of the co-signers of the plan, thinks that it is too early to make public the nature of the contacts they had with the Army General Staff. Neither did he deny the reports. Duly Brutus prefers to speak of reservations on the part of the military. [passage omitted]

Deputy Antoine Joseph, the godfather of the plan, expresses reserved optimism following his meeting with the Army high command. The MIDH [Movement For the Establishment of Democracy in Haiti] legislator believes that the Army has no interest in blocking the solution to the crisis, as proposed by the deputies—a plan that Joseph called efficient, realistic, and peaceful. The former president of the lower chamber, however, expressed the hope that Haiti's Armed Forces will not again miss the chance to emerge honorably from the crisis, while protecting the institution from a new political adventure. [passage omitted]

Talendier Desjardins, author of a draft resolution for the indictment of President Aristide, a month ago, was also part of the delegation that traveled to Washington, then to Army Headquarters. For the deputy from Tiburon, it is still early to say that the Army has rejected this plan. [passage omitted]

Since 2 March, this plan has become a resolution. Today, we await whatever comes next. [end recording]

Bazin Offers Full Support

FL0703190694 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1700 GMT 4 Mar 94

[Text] MIDH [Movement For the Establishment of Democracy in Haiti] supports the legislators' plan. Marc Bazin's party considers this document to be based on a sound analysis of the crisis and thinks it offers a satisfying framework for a negotiated and peaceful settlement. MIDH president Bazin asserts that the legislators' approach meets his party's objectives:

[Begin Bazin recording] MIDH fully supports this plan because—as has always been known—MIDH considers that in the current state of the country's sociopolitical conditions, the transition toward democracy can succeed only if it rests on a political compromise acceptable to all, based on reciprocal guarantees, without radical breakups, and without motives of revenge. It is the only formula that will bring all true democrats—realists from the Left, reformers from the Right—to the common task of remodeling a state in which responsible people would have no interest in seeing even more destruction. [end recording]

MIDH, which has always favored a compromise, invites the key sectors in the crisis to work toward the success of the legislators' plan.

[Begin Bazin recording] That is the reason we are inviting all sincere patriots, especially the two concerned parties, in good faith and without any holdouts. To ask the Haitian people today to accept additional sacrifices can no longer honestly be justified. It is therefore urgent simultaneously to fill the political vacuum and to satisfy the conditions for an immediate suspension of the economic sanctions. Those are, in our opinion, the first inevitable steps toward the normalization of public life and the beginning of emerging from the tunnel. [end recording]

Port-au-Prince Mayor Proposes Modification

PA0803040094 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0112 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Report by Herold Jean-Francois]

[Text] Port-au-Prince, 7 Mar (EFE)—Port-au-Prince Mayor Evans Paul, who is also leader of the National Front for Change and Democracy (FNCD) today proposed a modification to the plan approved Wednesday [2 March] by the Chamber of Deputies to try to find a solution to the new deadlock in the Haitian crisis created by the [congressional] resolution.

Paul recommended "a commitment acceptable for President (Jean- Bertrand) Aristide, as well as for the other sectors involved in the crisis." In an interview for EFE, Paul blamed the international community and domestic sectors that have promoted the current deadlock, for the Haitian crisis.

"It is necessary to modify the proposal, which cannot be viewed as a plan yet. In order for it to become a plan, President Aristide and the other sectors must accept it," Paul said. "The international community has not adopted a firm position on the measures contained in the Governor's Island Accord and the ultimatum given to the military leaders by four countries (France, Canada, the United States, and Venezuela) which expired on 15 January," Paul stressed.

The FNCD leader said that some sectors support the dilatory tactics that have prolonged the Haitian crisis since 30 September 1991, when a group of military leaders overthrew Constitutional President Aristide. Paul also mentioned the lack of cohesion in the democratic sector, which has favored a "fatal confusion and a rotten situation," adding that the same situation prevails in the parliament.

The political leader said that different groups are acting in the Haitian political scene against democracy. "While some people are reacting emotionally and others are trying to maintain the situation of crisis, we must admit that there are others who are acting in good faith," Paul added.

With regard to differences expressed within the FNCD and the support for the parliamentarian resolution from the Party of the National Congress of Democratic Movements (CONACOM), Paul said those are normal situations in the various fronts and political coalitions. As an example, he mentioned the Nicaraguan Sandinist National Liberation Front and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador.

Paul, who said he is confident some legislators will change their position, said that "the FNCD's position has not changed and is based on strengthening democracy and respecting the democratic rules of the game."

Merimee on New Government, New Sanctions

FL0703214594 Port-au-Prince Signal FM Radio in French 1130 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] The UN Security Council president, French Ambassador Jean-Bernard Merimee, said he acknowledged the necessity for the formation of a new government headed by a new prime minister. However, he said that would not suffice to resolve the crisis. It is therefore necessary to reinforce the sanctions against the country. Furthermore, Ambassador Merimee says that a new draft resolution aimed at reinforcing the embargo was referred to the UN Security Council and that this draft resolution, which includes personal sanctions against the military, will become effective between now and next week.

[Begin Merimee recording] Finally, we have a draft resolution that [words indistinct], which establishes personal sanctions [words indistinct]. There must be a government. But that would certainly not be sufficient to bring the situation to normal. This is why the council has decided to go into action. [end recording]

It should be noted that a draft resolution providing for reinforcement of the international sanctions against Haiti was referred to the UN Security Council on 4 March by the group called Friends of Haiti. This draft resolution provides for a total commercial embargo except for food products and medicines, a ban on non-commercial flights to and from Haiti, and restrictions on travel abroad by the Haitian military and their close relatives.

Those measures will reportedly add further to the oil and arms embargo that has been in effect. Except for the clauses relating to travel restrictions, they will reportedly be implemented immediately; the new sanctions will reportedly come into effect 15 days after the adoption of the resolution. If this text is accepted, it will be the first time the United Nations has imposed a total commercial embargo on Haiti.

We recall that, in an article by Robert Novak and published on 2 March, THE WASHINGTON POST wrote that the effects of the embargo on Haiti are devastating and irreversible.

Haitians Demonstrate Outside Aristide-UN Meeting

FL0703233194 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1145 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] President in exile Jean-Bertrand Aristide considers the legislators' plan not in compliance with the Governors Island accord signed in New York last July, and even contrary to this accord in the context of reestablishing democracy in Haiti. This statement was made during a meeting with the UN secretary general. Jean-Bertrand Aristide spoke for more than an hour with the UN secretary general while several thousand Haitians demonstrated near UN headquarters in support of the president in exile.

It should be recalled that on the previous day, 4 March, the four countries, Friends of Haiti, had submitted to the UN Security Council a draft resolution reinforcing international sanctions against Haiti. The draft resolution provides for a total commercial embargo, except for food and medicine, the banning of non-commercial flights to or from Haiti, as well as some restrictions on travel by the authors of the coup d'etat and their relatives abroad. The UN Security Council is due to make a decision on this resolution within 15 days.

U.S. Envoy 'Sensitive,' Optimistic

FL0703233294 Port-au-Prince Signal FM Radio in French 1130 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Excerpt] U.S. Ambassador to Port-au-Prince William Lacy Swing said he is sensitive to the concerns of President Aristide who has rejected the plan proposed by Haitian parliamentarians as a resolution to the crisis. Swing said that he is optimistic about the chances of finding a solution to the crisis. He mentioned four reasons that should favor a quick outcome to the crisis: the context of change of political systems in the hemisphere, the consensus of the four countries called Friends of Haiti, the availability of massive economic aid, and the Governors Island agreement. [passage omitted]

U.S. Refuses Ties With 'Any' De Facto Government

FL0803010694 Port-au-Prince Signal FM Radio in French 1130 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Excerpts] The visit by (Michael Cozac), the assistant to President Clinton's special representative in the Haitian crisis, has come to an end. (Cozac) had arrived in Port-au-Prince over the weekend for the purpose of holding conversations with personalities involved in finding a solution to the crisis. Mr. (Cozac) termed the situation in Haiti encouraging. He made the Haitian military responsible for the reimposition of the sanctions. He explained that if the military respected their commitments within the scope of the Governors Island agreement, the sanctions would be lifted. He further said that the U.S. Government wants the Haitian Army to be professional and apolitical.

Furthermore, Mr. (Cozac) said that the Haitian parliamentarians' plan is a good and serious effort to disentangle the democratic process. In his opinion, the plan must not replace the Governors Island agreement, and the United States does not wish to impose a plan on President Aristide or to require from him actions not provided for by the 3 July agreement. Finally, Mr. (Cozac) gave the following warning, quote: The U.S. Government will not have relations with any de facto governments in Haiti, unquote.

Army Raid Uncovers Weapons Cache in Capital

FL0703233394 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1700 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] A military raid occurred on the night of 4 to 5 March during which the Army discovered a weapons stockpile in Port-au-Prince. At least six people were arrested following this operation that was conducted by about 50 soldiers.

Closed Power Station Results in Daily Blackouts

FL0803013094 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1700 GMT 3 Mar 94

[Excerpts] The hydroelectric power station at Peligre, the principal center supplying the Haitian capital, including the West Department, has been inactive for some time and might remain so for a long time. Peligre is closed for repairs. That is all we were able to ascertain. No answer was given to what kind of repairs, the cost of those repairs, or the duration of those repairs since the general manager continues to hide behind a great wall of silence. He has perhaps chosen not to speak with the press because our calls remain unanswered. Jean Max Blanc tries to find some explanations in the following report:

[Begin recording, in Creole] The problem of electricity in Haiti is not going to be solved by the end of the week or within a few days. Currently, the authorities of Electricity of Haiti [EDH] have closed the Peligre power station, which supplies power to the West Department. A high-ranking employee in the company told Radio Metropole that the authorities made such a decision in order to repair the Peligre station. However, this employee is not able to tell us how long those repairs will take, how much they will cost, or how much damage there is in the station.

Some say the damages are not inconsequential in the Peligre station. The management EDH will not confirm this information. The general manager, Axel Saint-Dic, never agreed to receive journalists and even refused to answer phone calls. Manager Saint-Dic, according to his secretary, is in meetings everyday. Perhaps Saint-Dic is seeking solutions to the electricity problem the country has been facing since 1990.

Although this problem is not new, it reached a new level some time ago. For instance, some neighborhoods do not have electricity at all, while others receive some electricity once or twice a week. Regardless of who comments on that problem, the answers are basically the same. [passage omitted]

The electricity problem in the country not only increases the prices of products, but also creates a change in lifestyle for Haitians. The problem of electricity is now closely linked to the problem of fuel. Some business people say those problems have caused the decrease in sales, and the prices of freezer products have increased. They explain that the greater the stock of products requiring refrigeration, the more fuel the generators need to operate. The result is that the consumers pay those costs while their purchase power is at a standstill. The other problem is that since the consumers cannot stock at home, they are obliged to spend more on gasoline to market everyday. [passage omitted] If people are more or less informed on the fluctuating price of gasoline, no one knows when Haitians will no longer have to face this electricity dilemma in the country.

While still waiting for the EDH general manager, Axel Saint-Dic, to answer questions regarding the importance and duration of the work to be done in Peligre, most of the neighborhoods in Port-au- Prince are blacked out, while others enjoy electricity 24 hours a day. Some residents explain that in addition to these problems, some people steal their transformers. The daily blackout encourages much negative behaivior, which is being reported in Port-au-Prince. [end recording]

Delegation To Reject U.S. Border Practices

PA0803041694 Mexico City LA JORNADA in Spanish 7 Mar 94 p 8

[Report by Jesus Aranda]

[Text] Nuevo Laredo, Tampico, 6 Mar—Upon arriving in Nuevo Laredo at the head of a Mexican delegation, Deputy Foreign Secretary Andres Rozenthal said the Mexican Government will today present the U.S. Government with its official rejection of the enforcement of unilateral immigration practices, such as new detection and detention methods. The Mexican Government will also express its disapproval of the construction of additional barriers at the border.

During the Mexican-U.S. meeting to be held on Tuesday this week, the Mexican delegation will present its views regarding each of the actions taken by the U.S. delegation in the past few weeks. Rozenthal also denied that the military exercises announced by the U.S. Army to be conducted at Fort Bliss, Texas, pose a military threat to Mexico or that the exercises are in any way related to border or immigration matters.

He added that at the end of this "high-level" meeting on immigration, authorities from the Mexican and U.S. consuls with offices along the border, in addition to officials from municipal, state, immigration, customs, and police organization, will participate in another session of the Liaison Mechanism for the Mexican-U.S. Border.

During an interview, Ambassador Rozenthal commented that on this occasion the Mexican delegation "will have an opportunity to present its views" on the U.S. anti-migration policy, "an opportunity that was previously negated." "We were not consulted, only notified. For that reason, we will take this opportunity to present our specific remarks on those points," he said.

Rozenthal added that he will meet with Doris Meissner, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization commissioner, to discuss migration and the use of border-crossing cards, measures the two countries will adopt as a function of NAFTA to facilitate the movement of businessmen among the three countries. Also, special importance will be placed on the human rights of Mexicans emigrating to the United States.

In this meeting, the foreign secretariat delegation will present several proposals to control the entry of Americans into Mexico. U.S. citizens attempting to enter Mexico will have to show a personal identity document to prove their nationality. Rozenthal added, however, that the U.S. counterparts will be consulted prior to the enforcement of such an action.

"We will not do anything without first asking their opinion, then we will take specific measures," he said, clearly alluding to the unilateral increase of Border Patrol police members, the application of new methods for the detainment of illegal aliens, and the construction by the United States of additional barriers at the border. The Mexican Government has rejected those actions not only because they hamper relations between the two countries but because Mexico's opinion was not taken into consideration.

In today's meeting, Rosenthal will insist on a general solution of the immigration problem through full communication between the two countries, not through police actions such as those enforced by the U.S. Government.

After presenting studies on the consequences of anti-migration actions on Mexicans living in the United States, Rozenthal's delegation will initiate legal actions on behalf of the Mexicans.

Again discussing the U.S. Army's exercises in El Paso, Rozenthal said such exercises are conducted every year and that at no time has the Mexican Foreign Secretariat observed military actions related to border or immigration problems or the alleged deployment of military forces at the border.

Weekend Shoot-Out Leaves Three Police Dead

PA0803031094 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish 0000 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Telephone report by Baltazar Jimenez, reporter for EL SOL DE CHILPANCINGO newspaper, in Chilpancingo, Guerrero State; from the "ACIR Radio News" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] We reported to you at the start of this cast that three Guerrero State public security policemen were gunned down by shotgun fire and six others are seriously wounded. They were ambushed in the pre-dawn hours today [as heard] by a dangerous gang of criminals who operate in the Xapotitlan, Tablas Municipality, located high up in the mountains, according to information supplied by Manuel Noreno Gonzalez, chief of Guerrero State public security. Good afternoon, Baltazar.

[Jimenez] Good afternoon.

[Announcer] Baltazar, what happened this morning?

[Jimenez] According to a note by reporter Alfredo Guzman, several public security patrols were ambushed yesterday by excited villagers who were annoyed because several poppy plantations were destroyed. Three policemen were killed in the incident. Each received more than 15 shots in addition to the coup d'grace. The disturbances took place in the Atlixtlac Municipality. Alejandrino Campo Lezma, regional public security commander in Tlapa de Comonfort told the Prosecutor General's Office authorities that Saturday [as heard] night at about 0400, it was decided to carry out a patrol between the village of (Zaltizagua) and Oxtoepec, Atlixtlac Municipality. Campo said that two patrols made up of 10 men in one and seven in the other, began walking

at night and on the way found several poppy plantations, which they destroyed. The commander said that the plantations measured 10 meters by 20 meters and they found one or two every kilometer.

In his statement it was established that it was about 2000 on Saturday night when they heard several rifle shots and the policemen hid as best they could under trees. They ran until they reached Oxtoepec. There they made a head count and found that three were missing. They immediately spoke with the village police chief who promised to intercede with the alleged attackers to allow the policemen to look for their three companions who had disappeared in the shoot-out.

The commander stated that while speaking with the village police chief he saw several armed persons who arrived behind them and spoke in a dialect. After several minutes of negotiation, the armed persons allowed a search for the three missing public security policemen. The villagers in Oxtoepec allowed 10 policemen to enter, but only unarmed, to search for their companions. The bullet- riddled bodies were found at the clash site. The dead policemen were each missing their AR-15 rifles and their three spare clips.

The searchers say that they found no less than 70 heavily armed persons who threatened to shoot and kill them. [Words indistinct] who moments before had negotiated their entry, so the policemen were not harmed.

Yesterday at about 1900 a telephone call was received at the Chipalcingo coroner's office, telling them to prepare to receive more bodies, because seemingly another clash had taken place, causing the death of several public security policemen in several villages near Axtlistac Municipality. Lastly, this was not confirmed.

[Announcer] This is one of the most tangled areas of the Guerrero mountains?

[Jimenez] Yes, of course.

[Announcer] It is one of the more distant areas?

[Jimenez] Yes. The dead policemen are Second Commander Bertoldo Flores Radilla, Second Commander Artemio Salmeron Quinonez, and Armando Luna Venancio. Their bodies were claimed by their relatives and transferred to their places of origin. There is no information whether any arrests have been made because as it is Sunday there were no public security spokesmen to report what would be done and what action would be taken to arrest the guilty.

[Announcer] Baltazar, the bodies are already in Chilpancingo?

[Jimenez] This is not yet known.

Governor Questions Report

PA0803023794 Mexico City Radio ACIR Network in Spanish 0000 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Report by Jaime Flores from Tijuana from the "ACIR Radio News" newscast]

[Text] Baja California State Governor Ernesto Ruffo said today that the Attorney General's Office, PGR, report on the 3 March shoot-out at the border is not in keeping with reality. He stressed that there are very strong interests behind the clashes.

Governor Ruffo said at a news conference in Mexicali, the state capital, that his administration will continue to investigations even though the PGR has declared the case closed.

In Tijuana, Jorge Alvarez Barrieri, commander of the second sector of the State Judicial Police, said there are political motives behind the detentions and arrest warrants issued against members of the state judicial police as charges were fabricated against Deputy Prosecutor Sergio Ortiz Lara and PGR Agent Juan Carlos Guerrero Cermeno, both of whom have been accused of releasing three suspects.

Victor Clark Alfaro, director of the Binational Human Rights Center, said the judicial agents who are under arrest and those whose arrests have been ordered are only scapegoats and the real culprits have not even been mentioned. Clark Alfaro has demanded an investigation of State Prosecutor Juan Franciso Franco Rios as nobody can lift a finger without Franco Rios' authorization.

The 3 March shoot-out left four people dead, including two members of the Federal Judicial Police and one member of the State Judicial Police.

Deputy Attorney General Alfonso Cabrera Morales held a news conference on 7 March and said State Judicial Police agents were responsible for the shoot-out as they were protecting Ismael Higuera Guerrero, an assistant of the Arellano Felix brothers.

Report on PRI Anniversary, Colosio's Speech

PA0703173794 Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish 1300 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Report by unidentified reporter on speech by Luis Donaldo Colosio, PRI presidential candidate, during the commemoration of the 65th anniversary of the PRI at the Monument to the Revolution in Mexico City on 6 March; from the "Good Morning From Mexico" newscast; passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party] members nationwide, including governors, attended the ceremony. This ceremony followed a different pattern. For instance, this was the first time President Carlos Salinas did not attend the ceremony. In addition, photographs of

the incumbent president as the first PRI member of Mexico or other PRI founders were not displayed at the site of the ceremony as was done previously at commemorations of this type. The only photograph of President Salinas was displayed on a building next to the Monument to the Revolution—the PRI Regional Movement Building. Except for Health Secretary Jesus Cumate and some undersecretaries, no cabinet members attended the ceremony. Colosio arrived with PRI President Fernando Ortiz Arana. There was no preamble prior to Colosio's arrival, which even surprised PRI members. Colosio was the only one on the stage and waited only for the introduction by the master of ceremonies to begin his speech.

In his speech, Colosio referred to the relationship between the PRI and the government. He said that in light of the elections, the PRI only asks for impartiality from the government. He emphasized that the times of political competition in the country have ended any presumptiors regarding the presence of a state party.

[Colosio] "When the government has sought to monopolize political initiative, it has weakened the PRI. This is why today, in light of the elections, the PRI only demands from the government impartiality and firmness in the application of the law. We do not want concessions that are not based on votes or votes outside the law. [applause] Let us not seek to replace the responsibilities of the government, but let us not seek either to have the government fulfill the duties that only concern the PRI as a party. Today we are facing a genuine contest. The government will not give us the victory. It will only be the product of our work, our effort, and our dedication."

Later, Colosio pointed out that it would be very difficult to explain modern-day Mexico without considering the PRI's contributions. That is why, he said, those who argue that Mexico's democratic transformation demands the PRI's disappearance are mistaken.

[Colosio] "We offer change with direction, responsibility, peace, and tranquility. Those who believe that Mexico's democratic transformation demands the PRI's disappearance are wrong. Indeed we have made our mistakes, but it would be very difficult to explain modern-day Mexico without considering the PRI's contributions. This is why, despite our defamers and the criticism of our adversaries, we are proud to be PRI members."

Continuing with the electoral topic, Colosio said that the PRI will participate in the 21 August elections with total respect for Mexico's multiparty system. He stressed that there will only be one winner that day, and added that only the clear and unobjectionable victory of the Mexican people will be acceptable.

[Colosio] "For the Mexican people to obtain a victory on 21 August, all political parties will have to abide by the law, without advantages granted to anyone, prepotency, abuse, or arbitrary actions. That is why, and in accordance with my demand for a democratic election, I hope Congress will implement the necessary electoral reforms based as always on the agreements parties have achieved within the framework of the Agreement for Peace, Justice, and Democracy signed on 27 January."

Luis Donaldo Colosio commented on the participation of observers in the elections. He said one must not look at them with fear.

[Colosio] "The election belongs to society. For that reason, it cannot be a closed matter. Its pristine nature demands the participation of observers and does not preclude our citizens and visitors from abroad from giving a very thorough account of it. There is no reason at all to look with fear at those who wish to become acquainted with the nature of our democratic processes. Our elections—and I am saying this with full conviction—will have nothing shameful to hide."

Referring to the topic of Chiapas in his speech, Colosio said this situation appeals to the conscience of all Mexicans. He noted, however, that this proposal for change is not limited to Chiapas but covers all Mexicans.

[Colosio] "We want to keep our promises to Chiapas residents and also to Mexicans in Laguasteca, La Laguna, the mountains in Guerrero State, the northern mountain range in Puebla State, [name indistinct] and Alvaro Obregon's Barranca, the Federal District, Ciudad Juarez's (Anapra) Port in Chihuahua State, Guadalajara's Insurgentes Neighborhood in Jalisco State, and Monterrey's Bernabe area in Nuevo Leon State."

The candidate commended the Mexican Army.

[Colosio] "Our institution proved its legitimacy and efficiency, emerging stronger from the solution to the conflict. From this dais I convey my words of praise to the Mexican Army for its patriotism, loyalty, and selflessness in defending national interests and unity."

Colosio criticized the attitude of PRI members regarding the Chiapas conflict.

[Colosio] "PRI members must reflect on Chiapas. As the party of stability and social justice, it shames us to feel we were not sensitive to the major demands of our communities, we were not next to them in their aspirations, we were not up to the commitment they expected from us."

To conclude, the PRI candidate stressed that the main thing he is proposing with change is change with responsibility, where no area of the country's life is forgotten. He reaffirmed his commitment to head the new phase of change in Mexico.

[Colosio] "With firmness, conviction, and full confidence I say: I want to be president of Mexico to head this new phase of change in Mexico!" [applause]

Magazine Concerned Over Voting Predictions

PA0403200994 Mexico City LA JORNADA in Spanish 2 Mar 94 p 13

[Report by David Carrizales]

[Text] Monterrey, Nuevo Leon State, 1 Mar—Federico Reyes Heroles, director of ESTE PAIS magazine, said today when commenting on a poll by this magazine that it is a matter of utmost seriousness for the country's politics when 40 percent of Mexicans believe there will be electoral fraud in the August elections, because whoever wins will have governability problems.

The political analyst added that according to another poll held in December, 41 percent of the electorate would vote for Luis Donaldo Colosio, 20 percent for Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, and only 11 percent for Diego Fernandez de Cevallos. Nevertheless, he said these results were not published and now none of the political parties that support these candidates (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party; PRD, Party of the Democratic Revolution; and PAN, National Action Party, respectively) want any further polls.

He explained that the reasons for this are that the PRI's Colosio has sold the idea that he has a 65-70 percent backing, the PRD bases its campaign on an alleged democratic switch that has not taken place so far, and PAN does not want to admit that its rapprochement with the government has cost the party about eight popularity points.

Reyes Heroles, who inaugurated a cycle of conferences programmed by Monterrey's Institute of Technology and Higher Studies, which includes the participation of all presidential candidates, said that for some people it seems surprising that 61 percent of the population backs in one way or another the Zapatist National Liberation Army (EZLN), but this can be explained when one takes into account that the government itself cultivated a cult for Emiliano Zapata and the Mexican revolution.

Chiapas Indians, Peasants Demand Solution

PA0703160294 Mexico City XEW Television Network in Spanish 1300 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Report by Juan Sebastian Solis; from the "Good Morning From Mexico" newscast]

[Text] Approximately 5,000 representatives of 40 Indian and peasant groups in Chiapas State marched through the streets of San Cristobal de las Casas on Sunday to demand solutions to problems involving land, justice, freedom, and democracy. The march, which was organized by the state committee of Indian and peasant organizations, was also supported by 300 teachers from Oaxaca. Some of the groups were formed solely by women. The Mexican flag was carried by Indian women.

The demonstrators gathered in front of the municipal building and held a four-hour rally in which representatives of each of the participating organizations spoke. Mrs. Marcela Gonzalez spoke on behalf of the Emiliano Zapata Peasant Organization [Organizacion Campesina Emiliano Zapata]. She said:

[Begin Gonzalez recording] We are standing up for Indian dignity, and no one is going to bring us to our knees. [end recording]

The demonstrators demanded the reform of Article 27 of the Constitution, a solution to the problem of delinquent loans, dismissal of mayors in Chiapas, and respect for Indian traditions and cultures. As they marched through the city, the demonstrators wrote their demands on the walls of houses and stores. They did the same on the walls of the San Cristobal de las Casas municipal building.

Costa Rica

Commentary Welcomes Trade Agreement With Mexico

PA0703215194 San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 1730 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Station commentary]

[Text] The trade agreement between Costa Rica and Mexico, which goes into force on 1 January 1995, will constitute Costa Rica's first step toward joining NAFTA, which has been signed by Mexico, the United States, and Canada.

Mexico had wanted to sign an agreement with all of the Central American countries, but the pressure exerted by both President Salinas and President Calderon—both of whom were eager to sign a bilateral agreement of such great significance for their countries—was decisive.

This agreement is undoubtedly one of President Calderon's personal victories, and it will represent great benefits for Costa Rica's development, particularly because it strengthens our independence vis-a-vis the unionist pressure by the remaining Central American countries.

Guatemala

Attack on San Juan River Bridge Condemned

De Leon Comments

PA0803024794 Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 7 Mar 94 p 3

[Text] President Ramiro de Leon Carpio has condemned yesterday's terrorist act that destroyed the bridge over the San Juan River. De Leon Carpio said he did not want to think that the URNG [Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity] staged the attack, because if they did, no one could rely on their political willingness to achieve peace in Guatemala.

The president confirmed that the damage has been estimated at 1 million quetzals, including the demolition of the structure, installation of a Bailey bridge today, and construction of a new bridge.

Army Blames URNG

PA0703224994 Guatemala City Teleonce Television in Spanish 1900 GMT 7 Mar 94

[From the "Telepress" newscast]

[Text] Official spokespersons for the Army Information and Press Department [DIDE] have blamed the URNG [Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity] for a terrorist attack early Sunday morning on the route to the Atlantic area.

[Begin recording] [Reporter] What information do you have on the explosion at the bridge over the San Juan River?

[Unidentified DIDE spokesperson] Once more the URNG has attacked Guatemalan society. This time they have blown up the San Juan Bridge located at the 20-kilometer marker on the highway to the Atlantic area.

For the time being, the Guatemalan Army Corps of Engineers is working in the area to put a Bailey bridge in place. This Bailey bridge costs 2,530,562 quetzales, and repairs to the bridge that was blown up will cost approximately 5 million quetzales. This ungrateful action by the URNG will cost Guatemalans 7,530,652 quetzales.

In addition, the action involves costs in the economic, business, and transportation sectors, as well as the threat and danger posed to the Guatemalan people at the time of the explosion. The Guatemalan people are still running a risk while the bridge is being repaired.

[Reporter] What type of explosives were used this time?

[DIDE spokesperson] The information we have is that strong dynamite charges were used.

[Reporter] How long will it take the Army engineers to repair the damage?

[DIDE spokesperson] In this case, the URNG destroys while the Army builds. The Guatemalan Army Corps of Engineers is setting up the Bailey bridge at this time. Traffic will be restored at approximately 1700 today, but it will take another 48 hours for the bridge to be fully operational.

[Reporter] Why did the URNG blow up this bridge?

[DIDE spokesperson] Right now we don't know. I don't think that is really important. What is important is that with this action, the URNG is showing how much respect it has for Guatemalans' human rights.

[Reporter] What do you think of the URNG's blowing up this bridge in Guatemala while holding peace talks in Mexico?

[DIDE spokesperson] This is very contradictory. While it is attending negotiations and holding talks for the benefit of all Guatemalans, at the same time it is acting against our society. The truth is that it is very regrettable. Guatemala is no longer willing to tolerate such actions. Actually, the damage to our country goes beyond all estimates.

[Reporter] On another subject, how about the fire early this morning in the former military hospital?

[DIDE spokesman] A fire began at about 0200 at the former military hospital in Zone 10. The fire was controlled at 0500. We still do not know the origin of this fire, but it started at the former administrative office, which was destroyed. It was a very old and deteriorated

building. That is why the military hospital was transferred to the new building at Zone 17.

[Reporter] Was anyone in the building at the time?

[DIDE spokesperson] There was no one there.

[Reporter] What are the damage estimates?

[DIDE spokesperson] The fire was early this morning, and personnel are currently evaluating the condition of the rest of the building. Reporters wanted to enter this morning, but we are first verifying the condition of the building before anyone is allowed in.

[Reporter] On another subject, have there been any armed confrontations between the Army and the guerrillas?

[DIDE spokesperson] I do not have any information to that effect at the moment, but there were no confrontations on Saturday or Sunday. [end recording]

UN Delegates Witness URNG Attack on Quiche Base

PA0803044894 Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 5 Mar 94 p 6

[Text] The Army Information Office has reported that terrorists of the self-styled Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) attacked the Aczumbal patrol base in Quiche while several UN Human Rights delegates were boarding a light airplane.

The source added that the airplane, registration TG-CAC and piloted by Gerardo Poitevan, carried 18 delegates, including Dr. Sergio Viva Scheel, a UN human rights consultant. This fact was later corroborated by Hugo Leon Mejia del Aguila, the human rights office assistant in Nebaj, Quiche.

The visitors witnessed the attack and saw how the rebels fired indiscriminately without regard for the fact that civilians were present in a flagrant violation of human rights, the Army report states.

The Guatemalan Army reported that this attack shows once again the guerrillas' lack of respect for the sacred right to life. After the rebel attack, the visiting delegations traveled without further incidents. The delegates did say they would report the event at the international level because the URNG's criminal action exposed its lack of political willingness to promote peace, the report concludes.

Nicaragua

Chamorro Plays Down Warning on River Dispute

PA0703234994 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1750 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Managua, 7 Mar (ACAN-EFE)— Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro today played down Costa Rican President Rafael Calderon's warning about taking the dispute regarding free navigation of the San Juan River, which borders both countries, to the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

"I do not believe we have to anticipate so much," Chamorro said when asked about her Costa Rican colleague's statements over the past weekend. Calderon said he disagreed with Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister Jose Pallais' arguments for charging a $5.00 fee for every tourist coming from Costa Rica on the San Juan River.

"We will wait and see what happens" with Costa Rican President Jose Maria Figueres Olsen, who will be sworn in on 8 May, Chamorro said in brief statements to the media after inaugurating a seminar on juveniles in prison.

Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister Pallais said Calderon Fournier's statements were "exaggerated" and considered it unnecessary to go to The Hague to solve their differences regarding the San Juan River. Nicaragua "is free to take the measures it considers appropriate in its territory, and Costa Rica must respect our decisions," Pallais told reporters when he referred to the immigration controls implemented by the Nicaraguan Government at the river, which is the border between both countries.

Last week Pallais asserted that the "Canas-Jerez" treaty signed in the last century "only" gives Costa Rica the right to navigate freely on the river for commercial purposes, not for tourism.

Borge Views Currents in Sandinism

94CA0077A Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 8, 9 Feb 94

[Speech given by FSLN Commander Tomas Borge at FSLN assembly in District IV, Managua]

[8 Feb p 7]

[Text] In any political party—and the Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSLN] is no exception—there are agreements and disagreements. I think it is necessary to determine where we are in agreement and where we are in disagreement.

It is said that some want reform and others do not, and yet, when it comes time to talk about reform, everyone is in agreement. No one in the Sandinist Front disagrees with the internal reform of the Sandinist Front; if anyone does, let them say so, because no one has said anything about it so far.

Who does not think there should be currents of opinion in the Sandinist Front? What happened in the true socialist countries? They forced party members to think in unison. You shouted in the town plaza, "National Directorate, give us your orders!" In other words, you had the same opinions as the National Directorate. Now you are beginning to doubt, to question, to agree; and

this thing called doubt, questioning, and agreement is democracy, the real possibility for each of us to express our own views.

The majority opinion should prevail, and that is what is called democracy. Therefore, we all agree on the need for political currents; that is another area of agreement. There is a framework for defining terms, and reference was made to it here. That framework is the program. The members of a party—and we are no exception—are members of the party to the extent that they agree on a program.

Political Program

What is our program? A framework of interpretations that has boundaries. We cannot go beyond the boundary if we want to be members of a party. Nevertheless, there are different shades of meaning and criteria in different subheadings that can only be reconciled by means of a political program.

A draft revision of the program is now being discussed. It must be discussed, and once we approve it, it will be our guide. Those who agree with that program may be members of the Sandinist Front; those who do not, may not. This discussion should not be based on intrigue, invective, or even praise, but rather on political differences.

What is contributing to these differences of opinion? People are promoting candidacies for elections to be held in the year 19-whatever, and the promotion of candidacies is causing individual alienation.

Promoting candidacies at this juncture may be damaging, and in fact it has been. In large measure, the consequences of this individual alienation are reflected in what has happened in the last few days. This should be another point we can agree on.

Candidacies for the National Directorate or the Sandinist Assembly should be promoted, not those for the presidency of Nicaragua or for deputy seats. Now, when we discuss who should be the candidate and how they should run, "we must think it over carefully." We are not going to nominate a candidate who will lose, but a candidate who will win. We must select the candidate who can assure us of victory at the time, but it must also be a candidate who shows respect for the revolutionary principles for which so much blood has been shed.

Now, are there political contradictions within the Sandinist Front? Yes, there are. There always have been. They used to be resolved in the National Directorate. Sometimes we were not satisfied. There was a certain balance of power that favored some and hurt others; that was true, but differences were resolved within the National Directorate.

If there are personal differences, we can resolve them through political discussion, and it will not be difficult to resolve personal differences. Are there ideological differences? Yes, there are. Is it legitimate or not that there are ideological differences? What is the framework of ideological differences within the Sandinist Front, and what are its parameters? Our ideological differences with the liberals, for example, are extremely clear. It is undoubtedly more difficult to delineate ideological differences within a party that claims to be revolutionary.

There are revolutionary ideas and, apparently, ideas approximating social democracy. Sometimes, however, we succumb to subjective assessments and we call some people dogmatic and others social democratic. But where there is smoke, there is fire, and in this ideological reign there is smoke.

If there are, perchance, social democratic tendencies in the Sandinist Front, we might ask, "What is social democracy?" Social democracy split off from revolutionary socialism in the last century, from the communist and socialist parties of the time. The social democrats said these parties were obsolete. They said we needed a profound reform, and we must also abandon political violence. We needed to give absolute priority to parliamentary debate.

This contradiction between social democracy and revolution in the new conditions in the world leads us to ask, "Is social democracy moving toward revolutionary positions, or is social democracy moving toward liberalism?" Are there areas of agreement and disagreement between social democracy and revolution? Are there areas of agreement and disagreement between social democracy and liberalism? Where does social democracy fit on the ideological dial, on the left or on the right?

[9 Feb p 11]

[Text] It appears that there are center-left social democrats and center-right social democrats. Social democrats have a fascination with the semantics of the center; either they are center-left or center-right. If they are not left or right, we must conclude that they are in the center.

So is the Sandinist Front social democratic or not? I would say that the Sandinist Front is not social democratic; the Sandinist Front is the Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSLN], with its own revolutionary ideas. But what happened, aside from stating that we are friends of social democrats, they have shown us solidarity and we are grateful to each and every party and to the Social Democratic International?

I think that although we are friends, we are not social democrats. We have not been until now. But I say, what mistake did we make? We asked to join as full-fledged members of the Socialist International. The Socialist International is the organization that brings together all social democrats. Our rank and file did not like the idea. Nevertheless, we insisted on becoming full-fledged members of social democracy. In the end, and wisely, I think, the social democrats realized that we were not social

democrats and did not accept our application for full membership; they left us as observers.

They were wiser than we were. But what were the consequences of that? It led to confusion, and some sectors of the Sandinist Front felt encouraged to move closer ideologically to social democracy. Since 1979 this faction has always existed, and it never has had an opportunity to express itself.

This situation has resulted, in my opinion, in a controversy that may lead us to make subjective judgments. Historically, social democracy was considered to be in the center. Social democracy has historically advocated moderation—they have called themselves moderates—and they have historically advocated the reform of dogmatic parties. They have called themselves reformers, regardless of the fact that we have all been in favor of reform in this party. Perhaps that is why they have claimed that label exclusively for themselves. Those who feel that they are reformers here do not think that others are.

This situation must be discussed; we must ask our comrades to define their positions, because if they are social democrats or sympathize with social democracy, we are not going to expel them; they have a right to have their own ideas, just as others have the right to have other ideas.

Reform and Controversy

The prevailing ideas will be those of the Sandinist National Liberation Front. Within the context of these possible ideological differences, serious errors were made. The memory of fallen comrades was insulted, comrades who had always been respected in the ranks of the Sandinist Front. I am referring to Rogelio Ramirez, whom we knew personally, a comrade who shone with his own light, who served the Sandinist Front years before the social democrats became Sandinists. We must respect him, just as we must respect all comrades, and not just those who are dead but also those who are alive, but especially those who are dead.

Sometimes the enemy makes up stories that we own businesses, motels, and this and that, and afterward everyone repeats the enemy's stories as if they were true, when they are made up to discredit the leaders of the revolution so that they will lose their authority. And if they lose their authority, the Sandinist Front deteriorates.

It is legitimate, therefore, to have differences of opinion and to discuss them. We should not be afraid of differences. I am more afraid of homogeneity in opinions, because only sheep think the same way, perhaps because they do not think. And I was telling some comrades on the directorate, and I tell everyone, "What happens if I want to be the secretary general of the Sandinist Front and the congress says no? Will I go off and form another party?"

What happens if I want to run for president of Nicaragua and the congress says no, and nominates someone else? Will I go off and form another party? Do I have the right to divide the Sandinist Front because my individual aspirations were not satisfied?

And what is true for me is true for everyone. What do we want? To be deputies? To be political secretaries? To be secretary general, president of Nicaragua, or members of the FSLN? We cannot have the slightest doubt: We are members of the Sandinist National Liberation Front.

No one can take that away from me, no sir, because we may not have the honor of being president—the person who is nominated for the presidency will have that honor—but the greatest honor for us is to be members of the Sandinist Front. And those who would leave the Sandinist Front because they are not chosen to run for the presidency or a high-ranking office, secretary general or deputy, let them leave. But they are turning their backs on the greatest honor we have as Nicaraguan revolutionaries: being members of the Sandinist National Liberation Front.

3-80 Leader Interviewed on RN Integration

PA0803015194 Managua Radio Corporacion in Spanish 1330 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Interview with 3-80 Northern Front leader Jose Alberto Talavera, a.k.a. "El Chacal," by unidentified Radio Corporacion reporters; in (Caulatu), northern Jinotega; date not given; monitored in progress—recorded]

[Text] [Talavera] ...That is part of the government's not honoring its word, and that is why it is now confronting so many problems, like the demands being made by the peasants in Managua. That is why we do not trust the government to keep its word, and why we feel tomorrow, the government might decide not to honor its commitments. You could say we are on the alert. We are keeping a watchful eye on the government to see if it will follow through with its promises. As I said before, in previous years the government has not kept a significant number of agreements with us. I could even say it has not honored even a small part of the agreements that were very important to the Nicaraguan Resistance [RN] movement at the time when it was armed. The RN movement continues to be an organization with a very ample social base, which, by the way, is still quite significant.

[Unidentified reporter] What about the call (Jimmy Leo), president of the RN High Council, made to the 3-80 Northern Front through several Managua radio stations; a call for an end to the negotiations agenda with the government, while problems such as land distribution, ownership titles, and hunger strikes are still unsolved?

[Talavera] With respect to statements made by the RN High Council president or vice president, we completely support them as part of the resistance. We also feel a certain degree of solidarity with all the commando units that support the

peasants who are participating in a hunger strike. A very just cause is what has forced them to adopt this hunger strike decision because the government has not honored its obligations. We have a responsibility toward them, and we want to say that from the moment they decided to go on a hunger strike, we, in turn, decided to pressure the government to keep its word.

[Reporter] Will that in any way interfere with negotiations already carried out with respect to an initial demobilization?

[Talavera] Since we consider ourselves responsible people, there might not be a need to interrupt negotiations, but if we have opportunities, like tomorrow at 1000 hours, when we are scheduled to meet face to face with government representatives, we will call attention to the plight of those Managua peasants.

[Reporter] What is your opinion of the decision by "El Charro" and "Northiel" not to demobilize?

[Talavera] We have received information indicating that there has been some contact between mediating organizations, such as Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo's commission, the CIAV-OAS [International Commission of Support and Verification-OAS], and an exchange of letters. I believe it would be premature to talk about whether or not they will decide to demobilize. If I decided to comment on this issue, I would most likely be speculating. They are also fighting, however, for the same things we are, and we expect there will be a satisfactory solution to the problems. In all reality, Nicaragua's problems have not been solved, and the government has complicated things even more by not honoring its obligations.

[Unidentified reporter] This morning's BARRICADA newspaper ...

[Talavera, interrupting] What's that?

[Reporter] This morning's BARRICADA newspaper reported that the 3-80 Northern Front had sold its Redeye missiles to drug traffickers. The report also pointed out that the missiles had been sold for $25,000 each. What can you say about this?

[Talavera] All I can say about the alleged sale of Redeye missiles by the 3-80 Northern Front is that the person who wrote the report is very irresponsible. The author reveals information in a very malicious manner and attempts to manipulate Nicaraguan public opinion and portray us as worthless people. Maybe he is worthless and that is why he wrote that report. All I can say is we have never associated with drug traffickers or become involved in any other type of corruption.

[Reporter] You still have the missiles under your control?

[Talavera] Of course. We still have a significant amount of weapons under our control. The demobilization process involves at least 100 or more men ...

[Reporter, interrupting] Do you plan to turn over the Redeye missiles once the demobilization process is over?

[Talavera] So far, we are in a negotiation phase. We have initiated negotiations the same way as we have initiated negotiations with respect to demobilization. Tomorrow we have another meeting scheduled with the government. It follows a process.

[Reporter] Jose Angel, what words do you people use to talk to the government about the RN's general problem, whether it is poverty, desertion, etc.? According to the 3-80 Northern Front, how many men participate in RN activities?

[Talavera] Nearly 30,000 active military men are involved in RN activities. Also, hundreds of thousands are involved in the social problem. Our biggest problem is that peasants, who make up the RN's rank and file, are one of the most seriously ignored sectors.

[Reporter] In addition to the information reporter Alvaro Cruz read to you, we have also heard that you have been getting support from Honduras. Some newspapers have hinted that the RN has received aid from Honduran military men. What can you say about this?

[Talavera] Those reports are groundless. Their only grounds is speculation. We have never been supported by any government. Our struggle has been 100 percent nationalist and supported by the Nicaraguan people.

[Reporter] Commander Chacal, will some of the demobilized RN commanders participate in the training classes to be held at the Walter Mendoza police academy?

[Talavera] Only line officers from the first demobilization will attend the course at the Managua Police Academy. The rest of the officers, who will work in the country's northern municipalities, have yet to participate in the course.

[Reporter] Commander Chacal, when will the RN's main body be incorporated into the RN Party?

[Talavera] RN is united as an organization. We are keenly interested in consolidating a party that can represent and be the political arm of the peasants, workers, and students. We must say the organization has been growing steadily. We want to be incorporated into the RN party as soon as possible. I believe only details remain to be worked out and that all RN sectors want to form a single party, a political arm to coalesce all of the RN members as well as the rank and file.

[Reporter] Has the 3-80 Northern Front been assigned any responsibility in the RN High Council? I understand that you have talked to the High Council.

[Talavera] We have not met with the RN High Council, but we want to belong to it so we can be more active and be heard. As soon as we lay down our arms, our struggle becomes a civic one.

[Reporter] Commander Chacal, how do you explain the RN party's failure in the Atlantic Coast elections, where the RN did not win a single seat?

[Talavera] I do not know what really happened at the Atlantic Coast elections because we were busy with other problems. We were confronting a military offensive. I do not think the RN's failure to win even one seat represents much. I think, however, that this is due to a scarcity of available resources and a lack of publicity. We do enjoy broad support in the Atlantic Coast. Of this I am sure.

[Reporter] Commander, what are your comments on criticism from exiled Nicaraguans in Miami who say that the fact that the 3-80 Northern Front has agreed to demobilize is treason to the RN.

[Talavera] The people who have expressed that opinion are totally removed from the real situation here in Nicaragua. I have belonged to the RN for many years. I was brought up in this. I have never felt like I betrayed the RN. Proof of that is the fact that I have the support of all the peasants in northern Nicaragua and of the leaders who are in command. We do not feel we have turned our backs on these peasants. On the contrary, I would say this is being looked at from another point of view. There are some people who like to talk, and those who talk the most are the ones who do the least. That is the situation. The people who made those comments had no bases for doing so. The reality here is totally different. It is not the same to live in Miami and to see war on television as to face the enemy not knowing where to obtain resources, secure logistics, ammunition, and other type of war materiel. What does one do with the wounded, the dead, and the grieving? What will be done with the war disabled? What will be done about a number of consequences brought on by war?

I regard the type of information given by certain gentlemen in Miami as totally irresponsible. We have very solid social foundations, we have good friends, but there are those who always like to find fault. There are some bad Nicaraguans who are always on the lookout. They are always trying to criticize, but their criticism is totally destructive. The reality here in Nicaragua is totally different.

[Reporter] The matter of Northiel [Wilfredo Gutierrez or Wilfredo Chavarria], Charro, and other members of the 3-80 Northern Front is still pending. What is the position of these cells or groups led by specific commanders regarding the demobilization plans or negotiations with the government?

[Talavera] In the case of Commanders [name indistinct], Charro, and Northiel, I think the negotiations will have to be held directly with them. The 3-80 Northern Front is negotiating independently. We believe that the commanders who lead those troops will negotiate directly with the government.

[Reporter] Commander Chacal, could you give us the names of those who make up the 3-80 Northern Front general staff?

[Talavera] There is a board of commanders. Commander Piloto, Commander Carlos, Commander Chacalin [Salvador Talavera "Esteban"], Commander Gringo, Commander Musun, and Commander Martin are some of them. There are several other commanders whom I do not-....[pauses] There is Commander Magnum.

[Reporter] Tell me something, are the troops or groups led by Northiel or Carlos part of the 3-80 Northern Front?

[Talavera] We consider them brothers as we are struggling for the same cause, but the 3-80 Northern Front is totally independent from those commanders.

[Reporter] Commander Chacal, excuse me if I insist, but do you really have a great deal of faith that the government will meet the agreements signed?

[Talavera] We have hope, as I said before, and we also have faith. The fact of the matter is that we have our apprehensions. On previous occasions the government has not met its commitments, but we hope that this time they will not repeat the same actions or that they will not fall into the vicious circle of making promises that they don't keep.

[Reporter] Commander Chacal, what can you tell us about the work in the labor unions carried out by the RN Superior Council in Managua.

[Talavera] It has been very well done. Any organization that seeks to unite the RN has my blessing. I congratulate the commanders who have shown interest in the RN going down one road under one leadership. I congratulate the general command and the supporters who participated. Many of them in the party and in the RN Supreme Council are actively participating to unite the entire RN organization.

[Reporter] It would be interesting to know the scope of the demobilization plan, because the government always claims it lacks the funds needed to cover demobilization expenses. How much money will be required to implement the plan?

[Talavera] That is true. The government always claims it lacks funds for this purpose, although it has funds for other activities. In reality, the needs and demands of peasants in this area are very high. Our goals, however, are beyond the government's promises and agreements. We have created commissions to request international aid to lessen the government's burden and to help peasants join the nation's social and productive life.

[Reporter] Does that mean the government will have to resort to credits from banks and to money that is not readily available or that is obtained at a high cost? If you request international aid, what will be the state's contribution?

[Talavera] We are not talking about specific amounts yet. We do know that there are many social demands, that the peasants need assistance and financial aid. The government has many responsibilities toward peasants that it has not accepted. We cannot give exact amounts. We are not saying the government should give them handouts but that they should reincorporate them into society and find ways to help peasants in the northern region who have been totally neglected in the past years.

[Reporter] What will happen if the government does not comply?

[Talavera] We are always ready to continue our struggle. We will continue our efforts and present our demands. We will resort to all civic and peaceful means to demand full compliance with the agreements. Based on our experience, I know there will always be problems, but we do hope we will not have to pressure the government to ensure its total compliance. The negotiations have just begun. It is a process, and we hope this time the government will act in good faith.

[Reporter] Commander Chacal, what was the purpose of Esteban's visit to Managua this weekend?

[Talavera] Esteban visited Managua for several reasons. First he had to go to the police academy to receive a group of demobilized 3-80 Northern Front members who are participating in an intensive course before going to the municipalities where they will be stationed. He also had to coordinate future meetings with the central government, which I believe will be headed by Government Minister Alfredo Mendieta. Those were the main reasons for his visit, to receive the group of former combatants in Managua and to create a direct channel between the Government Ministry and the 3-80 Northern Front to avoid future obstacles that could delay the negotiation process.

[Reporter] There is an interesting factor. The second chief of staff, who I believe is Javier Carrion, has held talks with the 3-80 Northern Front High Command. Do you feel you can trust this top EPS [Sandinist People's Army] officer? We have heard peasants say that there is still espionage and persecution. Do you think you can trust him as member of the Army since he was the one who talked to you?

[Talavera] We must accept certain things. We must talk with the people who have power in Nicaragua. Those who have the weapons are the ones who run the country. The Army has the weapons and is involved in the struggle. The government sent its representatives, and Colonel Carrion was one of them. We participated in direct talks at the negotiating table.

We must admit, however, that we have our misgivings. Security was one of the key points discussed at the meeting. We know full well that our lives are in serious danger once we demobilize. Therefore, one of the most critical topics we discussed at the meeting, which was suspended on several occasions, was security. We are afraid that once we demobilize we could face direct persecution or be killed. The hundreds of commanders who have been killed are proof of that. We must act maturely in these negotiations to prevent persecution or attacks in the future. We had to make this clear. One of the agreements reached to give security to our troops was their admission into the National Police.

[Reporter] What does that agreement entail? To what extent would the police serve as a guarantee for the security of the RN's 3-80 Northern Front?

[Talavera] Most of those demobilized in the northern area are former RN members. All 3-80 Northern Front fighters live in this area and were born and raised here. After speaking to them, they confirm that they intend to continue living here. Therefore, this would help them a great deal, and they would feel more confident as it would remove the tensions thanks to the constant contact with their own people and organizations in their own backyard. It is only logical. That does not mean we do not feel at ease with Nicaraguans from other parts of the country. It is really a reflection of the military problem, the military conflict, which since last decade has been bloodier in this area than anywhere else.

Panama

PRD Leader Sees U.S. Plan Against Candidacy

PA0803020094 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 0036 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Panama City, 7 Mar (DPA)—Panamanian opposition [presidential] candidate Ernesto Perez Balladares charged today that U.S. "ultraconservative" members "entrenched" in the U.S. services in this country are attempting, through a plan, to prevent him from winning the upcoming 8 May general elections.

Ernesto Perez Balladares, Democratic Revolutionary Party [PRD] leader, told a group of newsmen that the plan goes from slander to injury to possible murder. The PRD and former dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega were overthrown from power by the U.S. invasion on 20 December.

Perez Balladares noted that U.S. officials appointed during the administration of former U.S. President George Bush, apparently are not resigned to the PRD returning to power. He added that the U.S. plan has been coordinated with supporters of the conservative and neoliberal candidate, former Comptroller Ruben Dario Carles, who supported the U.S. military action against Panama.

Ernesto Perez Balladares currently leads by a significant margin in all presidential polls published, followed by former Comptroller Carles. The opposition candidate said he has strengthened his personal security and will be very careful in his political tours because "I don't want to die at the age of 47," he said.

Argentina

Menem Views Political, Economic Situation

PM0703153994 Madrid ABC in Spanish 20 Feb 94 pp 36-37

[Interview with President Carlos Menem by Jose Olmo y Losada in Buenos Aires; date not given]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Olmo] Are you concerned about the image of yourself and your government which may exist in Spain?

[Menem] I do not know what image of myself or my government may exist in Spain, but I believe that Argentina has become a center of attraction internationally. It is one of the countries with the highest growth rates in the world, in third place after China and Thailand, and, with respect to the Western world, one of the most developed of the past few years. Investments are still coming in, and there is a very good level of wages. The highest wages in the Americas (if we leave out the United States) are paid in the Argentine Republic. Poverty has fallen spectacularly, to such an extent that from 30 percent structural poverty in 1989 we are now at 12 percent. And marginal poverty, which is hardship, has fallen from 10 percent in 1989, when I took office, to 2 percent at present. Stability persists, and inflation, if we measure it from January of last year to January 1994, does not exceed 6.5 percent. According to the budget forecasts, inflation will not exceed 4.5 percent this year. There is peace; there is calm. I do not know what image people in Spain may have of Argentina and my government, and whether this is due to the dishonesty of some section of my country's news media, which may have influenced Spain, but the impression which we have is that Argentina's image in the world is excellent.

Personal Image

[Olmo] Do you believe that there is some anti-Menemist lobby in Spain which obstructs Spanish-Argentine relations?

[Menem] I have no knowledge of this, but it could be so. If we are speaking of anti-Menemism, we would have to speak of anti-Argenitinism. This government represents Argentina, is the government elected by the people, and I can see no reason why this kind of situation should exist. It may exist, but this does not harm in the slightest the image of Argentina or its government—one of the most progressive in the world. [passage omitted]

[Olmo] Is there subversion in Argentina? Could another Chiapas happen here?

[Menem] There is no subversion in Argentina. Some kind of tinge of subversion has occurred—the case of Santiago del Estero—but measures have been adopted and this is under investigation. But there is no subversion in the Argentine Republic; it does not exist, and it is absolutely impossible for what happened in Chiapas to happen here. The Mexican Government itself has acknowledged the extreme poverty in which those communities in Chiapas are living, but, moreover, there is an ethnic problem and a religious problem there; something that is not the case in Argentina. There is no possibility of subversion here. What happened in Santiago del Estero was caused by some kind of infiltration, and this explains the remarks of Daniel Ortega—the Sandinist leader—in Cuba a few days ago, in which he justified armed struggle and gave Chiapas and Santiago del Estero as examples. What happened in Santiago del Estero was facilitated by the terrible political administration. The province's leaders were not paying wages, or those of the highest ranking officials were increased unduly, leaving those of the other public employees very low. But the situation has now been completely restored to normal, and if you look at a scale of the wages earned by Argentine teachers, you will be able to ascertain that those of Santiago del Estero are now the highest in the country.

[Olmo] Why is nothing as yet known of the alleged activists who caused the incidents in Santiago del Estero?

[Menem] This is being investigated, and Daniel Ortega's statements exempt me from making any comment. If Daniel Ortega gives Santiago del Estero as an example, it is because there were people there who were brought in by these elements; death traffickers, because subversion is death trafficking. What they cannot achieve within the framework of democracy they are trying to impose by force. You cannot justify armed struggle like that for no particular reason. Clearly, there were people of this kind, infiltrated into the uprising, in Chiapas, too.

Conflict with Chile

[Olmo] Chilean flags have been burned in Argentina and Argentine flags in Chile. The cause is the territorial dispute over Laguna del Desierto. Will this tension between the two countries ever cease?

[Menem] This matter of the Chilean flags burned in Argentina was a result of some trade union leaders' irrationality and uncouthness, but in any event those same leaders later expressed their regret at what happened with an apology to the Chilean people. We deem this matter closed. We regard the burning of the Argentine flags as an act of retaliation for what happened here. The burning of neither flag is justified in any way. We have resolved 22 out of the 24 border problems which we had with Chile through our doing—President Aylwin's and my own. The border problem of Laguna del Desierto is under international arbitration, and we are quite confident that the court's ruling will favor Argentina's aim that matters should remain as they have stood since the 1902 treaty. It is Argentine territory, occupied by Argentinians, and recognized as such by Chile until 1958, when it adopted another stance. [passage omitted]

Bolivia

Vice President Views Gore's Scheduled Visit

PY0803031294 La Paz Television Nacional Network in Spanish 0100 GMT 8 Mar 94

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The United States is one of the countries that renders more financial assistance to Bolivia, although part of this assistance is conditioned on results obtained by Bolivia in its fight against drug trafficking. Bolivia and the United States share bilateral interests such as sustainable development and environmental preservation, which were discussed by the two nations' vice presidents in Washington in December.

[Begin Vice President Victor Hugo Cardenas recording] We have conveyed our invitation to Vice President Al Gore. I hope that in the near future we can have the honor of receiving the visit of such a distinguished personality in Bolivia. [end recording]

Cardenas, however, will not have to wait for Gore too long. On 20 March, he will visit Bolivia.

[Begin Cardenas recording] We want to have sustainable development that will respect and preserve the environment. Vice President Gore sympathizes very much with this yearning. [end recording]

During Gore's visit, U.S. support for overall growth objectives, which resulted in the establishment in Bolivia of the Sustainable Development Ministry, also will be discussed.

Bolivian Labor Group Opposes Participation Bill

PY0803012094 Cochabamba LOS TIEMPOS in Spanish 22 Feb 94 p A7

[Text] The Bolivian Labor Federation [COB] termed the popular participation bill announced on 20 February by President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada a "test tube embryo," and announced that labor union organizations will strongly oppose the legal measure, which they regard as "evil for the organized Bolivian movement."

COB Finance Secretary Carlos Camargo said the bill that has been submitted to Congress had "an artificial beginning" because it was not based on a "consensus" with representative Bolivian institutions. Camargo added: "It does not have the support and the essence of active participation by civilian society." Camargo then said he was optimistic that national authorities will reflect and discuss the bill recently proposed by the chief of state.

He reminded the government that the COB "was never against the implementation of a popular participation law; we did it in 1983 with the materialization of regional health programs, which set the stage for a larger program." Camargo added, however, that the bill recently announced to the country by the president of the Republic does not have the support of the great national majority. The COB leader warned: "It undoubtedly will meet the peoples' opposition because a law that has this sort of beginning has no future."

Mining leader Lucio Gonzales, COB social security secretary, said the popular participation law is nothing other than "evil for Bolivian labor organizations." He charged that the government, deep inside, intends to "bury labor unions in Bolivia to make room for neighborhood and peasant organizations that have little experience in Bolivia."

Gonzales said: "They have planned this carefully; with the law's implementation the COB and labor union organization demands will unavoidably disappear, thus clearing the way for them to implement their anti-patriotic and anti-popular policy."

Police Clash With Coca Producers in Chapare Region

PY0703163894 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1636 GMT 6 Mar 94

[Text] La Paz, 6 Mar (EFE)—Coca leaf producers and Bolivian police clashed violently in the Chapare region, some 600 kg east of La Paz, during the past few hours. An undetermined number of individuals were injured.

According to Jorge Martinez, president of Chapare's five coca producers' federations, "some peasants" died during the clashes, a report that was denied by Interior Minister German Quiroga who said that only one police agent and two members of the official Coca Reconversion Directorate (Direco) were injured.

Some 50 peasants armed with machetes, stones, and sticks clashed on 5 March with some 100 Mobile Police Unit for Rural Areas (Umopar) and Direco agents who intended to eradicate coca leaf plantations which, according to authorities, were being used for drug trafficking.

The peasants set various Umopar vehicles on fire, but Umopar forces repelled the attack with machine gun fire from helicopters.

This is the second violent clash with peasants in the Chapare region within the past 10 days. The clashes are the result of the government's determination to destroy excess coca cultivation that is being used for manufacturing cocaine and not for the traditional and legal coca leaf consumption.

The interior minister today told Radio Panamericana of La Paz that the Umopar agents' operation in Chapare on 5 March only intended to eliminate coca plantations that include maceration pits, which are used for cocaine production.

Quiroga said the Bolivian Government does not intend to eliminate all excess coca leaf plantations by force, adding that police only seek to eliminate plantations that include facilities for cocaine production.

According to the minister, other excess coca plantations must be eradicated voluntarily by peasants with the cooperation of local authorities and through the alternative development program.

Chapare region peasants, however, accuse the government of trying to forcefully eliminate all coca leaf plantations.

The Bolivian Government is committed to eradicating a certain number of coca leaf plantations annually in exchange for substantial U.S. economic assistance.

Bolivia is the second largest coca leaf producer in the world, after Peru, and the second largest cocaine exporter in the world, after Colombia.

Coca Growers Prevent Eradication of Plantations

PY0703232594 Cochabamba LOS TIEMPOS in Spanish 20 Feb 94 p A7

[Text] Peasant defense patrols are patroling the Cochabamba tropical region to avoid a compulsory reduction of coca plantations.

There is "a group of unarmed coca producers who, at the first attempt to force them to reduce their plantations, will blow their pututos [native Bolivian musical instrument] to summon the people."

Felipe Caceres, conflicts secretary of the Coca Growers Federation, said that if necessary the growers will arm themselves with sticks, machetes, picks, and big hoes to drive away those who try to destroy the plantations without giving anything in exchange." [no opening quotation marks as published]

Caceres said that the coca growers only seek to protect their interests and that "under no circumstances do we intend to protect drug traffickers. We believe trafficking is one of the scourges to affect the Chapare zone. It brings unrest to the coca growers. The repressive organizations, however, should take care of this task. We should not interfere in this work."

The peasants declared a general mobilization at the grassroots level after government organizations this week destroyed seven hectares of plantations in Senda Bayer and Villa Pagador, the excuse being that maceration pits used for producing cocaine paste had been found nearby.

The peasant organizations have organized "union watch groups" to control any infiltration of alien individuals who seek to mar the coca growers' image.

The coca growers have thus managed to halt the government elimination of what it regards as surplus plantations which, according to the government, surpasses 35,000 hectares in the Chapare and Yungas region.

Brazil

Foreign Minister 'Concerned' Over U.S. Trade Law

PY0803001594 Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL in Portuguese 7 Mar 94 p 2

[Article by Maria Helena Tachinardi in La Guaira, Venezuela]

[Text] Reacting to the U.S. decision to reinstate its Super 301 trade law, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim said: "We are concerned about the use of unilateral measures. The spirit behind the GATT Uruguay Round agreement is that all problems should be resolved multilaterally. One of the Uruguay Round's major achievements was the decision to strengthen the multilateral system as an advanced way of resolving controversies." On 4 March, Amorim held a working meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart, Angel Burelli Rivas, in La Guaira, a city located near Caracas, to negotiate the signing of an economic complementation agreement between their two countries.

Although Venezuela has no substantive trade problems with the United States—as Burelli Rivas told GAZETA—the Venezuelan press gave wide coverage to the new measure announced by President Bill Clinton. The Venezuelan media believe the Super 301 will give Clinton special powers to pressure Japan into opening its market to U.S. products.

In the opinion of Burelli Rivas, the Super 301 could bring problems to the United States within the GATT Uruguay Round agreement.

Says Scheduled Gore Visit 'Very Positive'

PY0803023994 Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL in Portuguese 7 Mar 94 p 5

[Article by Maria Helena Tachinardi in La Guaira, Venezuela]

[Text] Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim described as very positive the visit U.S. Vice President Al Gore will make to Brazil on 21 March, when he will be received by President Itamar Franco. On the night of 3 March, Amorim confirmed here to GAZETA that Gore will meet Franco.

After visiting Argentina, Gore will come immediately to Brazil, where he will discuss topics such as the environment, sustainable development, and the U.S.-Latin American summit to be held in Washington this year.

Amorim said Gore will visit Brazil in an atmosphere of positive bilateral relations as a result of the U.S. decision to refrain from imposing trade sanctions on Brazil as part of its quest for ensuring protection of intellectual property rights. Commenting on this issue—which was resolved on 25 February, Amorim noted that Brazil benefited from the new framework created on the subject, that is, the wording of "TRIPPS" (Trade-Related

Intellectual Property Protection System) negotiated under the GATT Uruguay Round.

Amorim also noted that Brazil has made progress in this area and that his willingness to go to Washington on 16 February just to discuss the matter with U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor—during a 90-minute meeting—created a good impression in the United States. Speaking to this newspaper, Amorim said: "They felt that we have shown interest." Amorim said a new positive stage has started in our relations that is "very favorable for cooperation in sustainable development and investments. Potential issues of conflict have been eliminated."

Daily Views New U.S. Interest, Kantor's Actions

PY0803030594 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 6 Mar 94 p A4

[Article by Paulo Sotero]

[Text] Washington—Radiant with the agreement reached with the Brazilian Government, by which our country agrees to assume a leadership role in the implementation of the new intellectual property protection law that resulted from the GATT Uruguay Round, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor has become an enthusiast of Brazil in Clinton's administration. According to a well-informed source, last week he said to several of his colleagues: "See what you can do in Brazil's favor. The Brazilians are good people and it is time to give them a hand."

It has been almost a decade since we have heard a member of the U.S. Government say something similar. In view of the deterioration of Brazil's image and the interest in our country in Washington, any positive comments on Brazil in official circles were regarded, in the best of cases, as the prelude to a sarcastic joke.

Kantor, in truth, has a good political reason to try obtaining support for Brazil. He believes that positive gestures from other government areas will help the Brazilian executive branch convince Congress to approve the Industrial Property Code amendments agreed on with Washington. If this does not happen by mid-June, Kantor will resume his actions against Brazil; he will impose commercial sanctions against our country. Instead of a successful negotiation, Kantor will have resounding failure on his hands.

But, on the other hand, Kantor's new attitude may mark the beginning of a significant change in the U.S. attitude toward Brazil. The patents agreement is merely part of a process to review Brazil that already is being carried out simultaneously by several sectors of the U.S. Government.

Recent Brazilian decisions, such as the ratification of the nuclear nonproliferation agreement with Argentina and its decision to sign the Missile Technology Control Regime, have removed some ancient obstacles. The political stabilization program, the political implications of the IMF's support or rejection of the anti-inflationary program, and the increasingly tight deadlines for the signing of an agreement by Brazil with the creditor banks will force the Treasury to make decisions as of this week.

Another factor is the defects that have surfaced during the past few months in countries chosen by the United States as models for Latin American reform: The Chiapas rebellion in Mexico and revolts and signs of problems in the Argentine economy have revealed the weakness of the countries chosen as models and have prompted a reassessment of the region.

The domestic debate has hardly started. High-ranking government officials, such as Kantor, who currently uphold a more constructive and hopeful attitude toward Brazil admit that their stance is not predominant. But the possibility of a change of attitude does exist.

A recent internal analysis of the U.S. State Department implicitly appreciated the warning made by former Brazilian Ambassador to Washington Rubens Ricupero in December 1992 as he criticized the negative stereotype adopted by the United States regarding Brazil in a speech. Ricupero warned that this simplistic approach prevented the United States from truly valuing the democratic character of the country's transformation process. Focusing his attention on Chiapas and the meager growth experienced by Mexico and Argentina, the analysis' author resorted to former President Richard Nixon's famous theory and wrote that, in conclusion, the consolidation of political democracy and a free market economy in the region, upheld by Washington, is subject to what happens in Brazil.

The same theory was upheld last week by economist Albert Fishlow of California University. "The future of the hemisphere's economic integration will not be determined by the debate regarding Chile or Argentina's entry into NAFTA but by a future agreement to substantially reduce commercial tariffs between Brazil and the United States," asserted Fishlow. He regards that agreement as a natural result of the current stabilization program's success.

The geo-economic logic of the search for markets characteristic of Bill Clinton's foreign policy also has contributed to bringing Brazil back on to Washington's radar. For obvious reasons the U.S. Commerce Department has placed Brazil on the list of the 10 top emerging markets in the world, for which it is preparing specific penetration strategies. With an stable economy, development, and an increasing number of consumers, Brazil now fits U.S. interests.

Editorial Views Short-Term Effects of Super 301

PY0703203994 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 6 Mar 94 p A3

[From the "Notes and Information" page: "The United States Sidesteps GATT"]

[Text] We believed that the approval of the Uruguay Round of the GATT meant the threat of a international trade war, like the one of the 1930's which internationalized the recession, had been averted. Suddenly, however, by what may be deducted from the attitude of—paradoxically—the country that most struggled for the approval of the Uruguay Round—that is, the United States—we can see that the danger has not been averted. The Democrat U.S. Government, under the pretext of liquidating protectionist practices of other countries, refuses to solve its conflicts within the World Trade Organization [Organizacao Mundial de Comercio—OMC] which in April will replace the GATT by will of its members who want to upgrade the authority of this international organization.

We knew that a Democrat administration would strengthen U.S. protectionism. Lacking the force of Reagan, President Bush could not withstand the Democrats in Congress and ended by imposing trade retaliations on countries like Japan, India, and Brazil. Until now the so-called Super 301 has never been used, but Washington will now apply it against Japan, which refuses to remove some of its subtle barriers against the entrance of foreign products.

The U.S. reaction follows President Clinton's decision not to open further to international trade, especially in the field of services. The determining factor, however, was the publication of trade statistics by regions in 1993. In 1993 the United States, whose exports increased 3.7 percent and whose imports increased 8.9 percent, registered a trade balance deficit of $115.777 billion—some 37 percent up on the previous year. It must be pointed out that this was not the biggest negative trade balance ever registered in the United States—it reached $152 billion in 1987, a year when Washington needed support from its allies against the USSR and when it was attempting to avoid a trade war that could weaken the unity of the anti-Communist bloc. The most serious issue is that with $59.3182 billion, Japan was responsible in 1993 for 51.2 percent of the total international trade deficit of the United States. It is interesting to point out that after Japan comes the People's Republic of China, the future "big" trader of Asia, with whom the U.S. has a trade deficit of $22.7677 billion.

Washington wants the government in Tokyo to give up a type of protectionism that goes against international law. We recently observed an example of Japanese behavior when the Japanese Government opened the borders to foreign rice. No one in the country bought the imported rice even though it was cheaper, thus demonstrating the Japanese people's great solidarity with its farmers. This does not mean, however, that arguments about what can be considered abuses (which certainly exist) within Japanese protectionism, should be avoided at the OMC. By attempting to assume a bilateral trade policy, the United States is—without recognizing that an international organization and not its president should decide if a trade partner is violating the GATT norms or its spirit—encouraging a conflict. This kind of isolation on Washington's behalf is a kind of imperialism which may not be very well received by other countries. It must also be pointed out that the United States has been arrogant toward Japan, which is experiencing a difficult moment both in the economic and political field. The best results cannot be attained through bilateral negotiations based on power positions, especially regarding Japan which is now becoming aware of its political force...

We must add that not all U.S. citizens support the application of sanctions against Japan which, after Canada, is the second biggest client of the United States—buying from it $47 billion worth of goods and which is also its second supplier—by which it has been of service to the United Sates by forcing it to increase productivity. It must be pointed out that the sanctions announced will not produce an immediate effect: The first list of products that will be object of sanctions will be published by the end of September. Only then will the Tokyo government react by imposing restrictions on U.S. products—probably agricultural products, which will harm the U.S. primary production sector, which has great political influence. The issue is that taking into consideration the sanctions that will be effective as of October, the White House decision causes an immediate effect: It has brought down the prices of some agricultural products, among them soybean. It is possible that in the long term Brazil may gain from a trade war between these two large world powers, but we will be affected by the drop in some prices. We will then be able to see that only an international trade peace will be good for everyone in the long run.

Daily Views Problems in Talks With IMF

PY0503210294 Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL in Portuguese 2 Mar 94 pp 1, 12

[By Celso Pinto]

[Text] Brasilia—Brazil's negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are not going smoothly. The government still hopes to reach an agreement, but it is already admitting the possibility of postponing a bit the announcement to creditor banks, which was to have been made on 10 March.

A high-ranking Finance Ministry source outlined to this newspaper three areas of concern for the IMF: excessive foreign capital inflow and its impact on the monetary policy; public sector salary expenses; and the fiscal policy. A technician has said that the IMF is planning a primary surplus (discounting the payment of interest and monetary correction target of 4 percent of the GNP).

The government decided to avoid placing immediate restrictions on incoming capital. Provisional Measure 438, which was released yesterday, gives the government the possibility of creating an IOF [financial operations tax] of up to 25 percent on the net value of currency exchange operations. There is currently a 3 percent tax applying to foreign capital invested in bonds and other

securities, and a 5 percent tax applying to foreign investment in fixed profit funds in Brazil. There are indications that restrictions will be increased.

The IMF is also dissatisfied with public servant salary spending. IMF technicians claim that 1993 spending grew too much, in real terms. The government argues that this was the inevitable effect of legal decisions on salary equalization. In addition, it argues that during the Fernando Collor government, salaries were reduced to levels that are unsustainable in the medium term.

Rather than concentrating on salaries, the IMF concern has always focused on the fiscal adjustment. In this regard, the implementation of the URV [real value unit] opens new unknowns, about which the IMF is certainly concerned.

Here is an example mentioned by a technician: How will the URV conversion work for the salaries and utility rates of state and municipal governments? The federal government can control its own sector, for which austere rules were established, but states and municipal districts are independent. These variables obviously have direct influence on the deficit of state and municipal governments.

In the case of the direct federal administration, the rule established in the provisional measure creating the URV is clear, but the provisional measure still has to be approved by Congress.

The IMF is designing a primary surplus of 4 percent of the GNP as a target for the entire public sector, including state-run enterprises, states, and municipal districts. The matter is being comprehensively analyzed. The table released by the Finance Ministry to restructure the figures of the 1994 budget after approval of the Social Emergency Fund—which was promulgated yesterday—estimates interest spending at $7.7 billion, which is equivalent to slightly less than 2 percent of the GNP. This figure corresponds to federal administration expenses.

The Brazilian promise is to balance accounts from an operational point of view, excluding monetary and exchange rate adjustment, but including interest in real terms. This means that the bigger the spending in interest, the bigger the need for fiscal funds for zeroing the operational deficit.

The objective of the economic team by reaching a balance on operational terms is to end the government need to borrow money from the financial market through the issuance of securities except to refinance the debt principal. This would reduce the pressure on the private sector and would allow, in the future, a reduction of the interest rates paid by the government. In the short term, however, high real interest rates are an important instrument for controlling the implementation of the URV until the new real currency comes into effect.

There is an basic concept difference behind the fiscal debate. The IMF thinks that given that the Brazilian stabilization plan is being implemented in an atmosphere of political instability and during an election race, it will require a fiscal "overkill" [preceding word in English], that is, it will require the generation of a fiscal surplus beyond what would normally be necessary, as a sure signal of the Brazilian intention to stabilize prices. This is why the IMF initiated talks with Brazil about an operational 3 percent surplus of the GNP.

It has been demonstrated in the past few months, however, that it will be politically impossible to obtain more than what has been obtained. Economic team members say that the IMF has accepted the idea of a balance in operational terms and that it is only redoing its calculations to determine the consistency of such goal.

As for the "heterodox" component of the stabilization plan, a reliable source has said that there are different points of view inside the IMF. The "old guard" represented by Sterie Beza, chief of the South Atlantic Department, certainly prefers the traditional method of fiscal and monetary austerity. Younger experts support the principle of removing the indexation of the economy, as long as the "basic principles" of fiscal and monetary austerity are respected.

IMF Manager-Director Michel Camdessus is in a difficult position. His image was tarnished abroad and in Brazil after endorsing the economic adjustment plan of former Minister Marcilio Marques Moreira which never took off completely. Now, he is currently much more careful to express support for something inconsistent.

The IMF, however, does not want to be accused of being responsible for preventing the creditors from reaching an agreement with Brazil mainly because if the agreement fails, it would take a long time to find another opportunity, perhaps a year or two, as a consequence of the upcoming presidential inauguration.

Despite everything, the government is confident that the IMF will prepare a letter of intent and a memorandum of understanding in time to allow Brazil reach an agreement with the banks. The possibility of a postponement is nonetheless already being admitted.

It would be necessary to announce on 10 March the reaching of a technical agreement and to sign the agreement on 15 April, the day the agreement with the banks and bond issuance expire. Instead of postponing the 15 April deadline, which would require the approval of 95 percent of the creditor banks, it is possible that, if necessary, the date for announcing the reaching of an agreement be brought forward from 10 March. This would give the IMF experts more time to clarify their doubts and monitor the implementation of the URV.

A postponement of this kind, if it happens, will not be very traumatic. A postponement would be much more

serious if it were the consequence of disagreements over substantial subjects. But this possibility is currently not on the horizon.

There exists a frank skepticism toward the Brazilian stabilization plan in the IMF's sister institution, that is, in the World Bank (IBRD). The idea there is that the fiscal adjustment plan so far implemented is clearly not enough.

In the times of the economic plan of Minister Marcilio Marques Moreira, the IBRD was a harsh critic and clearly told the IMF that it did not agree with its endorsement of the Brazilian plan. So much so that the IBRD conditioned the approval of structural credits to Brazil on the execution of the agreement with the IMF for at least six months, something that never happened.

Paper Views Need To Adapt Laws to GATT

PY0503191994 Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL in Portuguese 2 Mar 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Maria Helena Tachinardi]

[Text] Brazil must modify its domestic laws to adapt them to the GATT Uruguay Round documents that will be signed on 12 April in Marrakesh, Morocco.

Last week, during a meeting at the Foreign Ministry with the rest of the ministries and the Central Bank, government representatives assessed the commitments Brazil will assume and the strictness with which it will have to implement the terms of the aforementioned document.

The Uruguay Round agreement will not only require the amendment of laws but also a change of attitude by the government bureaucracy such as the following:

The subsidy and compensatory payment code must be improved, especially because the defense of the Brazilian agricultural trade must be efficient, agile, and cautious to avoid mistakes such as the one that caused Brazil to lose a case within the GATT to the European Union (EU) regarding the application of the compensatory rights to powdered milk importers.

Marques Porto [chief of the International Trade Policy Department of the Foreign Ministry] said that the codes must be in keeping with the GATT procedures.

The Central Bank and the Finance Ministry will have to be alert not to increase obstacles to foreign companies in the area of financial services because the country will assume the commitment to freeze at the current level the restrictions for access to the market. That requirement will also be demanded from officials of the Transportation Ministry.

The improved regulations of the Brazilian customhouse must be ready before the enforcement of the commercial agreement of the Uruguay Round which is scheduled for mid 1995 goes into effect.

Brazil needs to have "a corps of specialists" in the GATT and in the European Union as well as an independent internal organization to deal with issues such as the compensatory rights and "anti-dumping" measures.

Until 12 April Brazil will no longer make any concessions to its Uruguay Round partners unless it receives some benefit.

It is said that the hope is that there will be no reduction in the U.S. quota for additional imports of orange juice and shoes.

The multilateral agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round which Brazil will sign in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 12 April will require the government to make a great effort to adapt them to the country's domestic laws. Last week, the Foreign Ministry called the attention of other ministries and the Central Bank to the need to improve mainly the codes on compensatory rights and subsidies because the defense of the Brazilian agricultural trade must be agile and careful at the same time.

Joao Gualberto Marques Porto, chief of the International Trade Policy Department of the Foreign MInistry, explained: With the approval of the "peace clause" included in the agreement on agriculture which restricts the complaints by the partners of the European Union—which are committed to the elimination of their agricultural subsidies in nine years which is how long the clause will be in effect—Brazil will be able to begin an investigation against the Europeans but it will have to "put it on hold" and, if possible, before charging them before the GATT, negotiate with them.

For example, if Brazil feels threatened by subsidized exports, it would be advisable first to get the Europeans to increase the prices of their products instead of immediately suing them for compensatory rights or anti-"dumping," said Marques.

The Brazilian failure in the powdered milk case was a lesson when Brazil lost in a "panel" (special committee of experts of the GATT) late last year a case on the request of the European Union which demanded the payment of compensatory rights on its export products. Marques Porto said Brazil will still appeal GATT's ruling because it continues to believe that the European Union subsidizes its sale of powdered milk, but it also recognizes that the terms were not respected and that this gave room to the European accusation that GATT procedures were not complied with.

Marques Porto said: "We have to reestablish a capable bureaucracy for a quick and effective defense that cannot be questioned: we must have the ability to detect the "dumping" or subsidy and establish the degree of damage with the application of adequate taxes. But it is essential that this be done in accordance with the procedures advocated by the GATT."

Another key issue was raised at the meeting between Brazilian Foreign Ministry representatives and those

from other federal administration agencies: Brazil's commitment to freeze at current levels its restrictions on foreign participation in the supply of services. Brazil had offered to maintain the "status quo" in this particular field which means that the Central Bank and especially the Finance Ministry must take great care not to increase red tape to make sure the country does not get punished. Marques Porto said: "Brazil cannot restrict access to its market any further."

It has been decided to follow Japan's suggestion on financial services and new negotiations will take place six months after the agreements reached at the Uruguay Round go into effect—somewhere in mid 1995—"taking into account the new conditions," to see whether the the GATT principle of most favored nation applies to this issue. This principle recommends that benefits granted to one country should be granted to all other member countries as well.

Marques Porto explained: "The Central Bank and the Finance Ministry will have to keep their eyes on the international situations to find out to what extent Brazil can improve its access to foreign markets and establish whether it is worthwhile to make a better offer." Marques Porto believes that the Uruguay Round will have a "significant impact" on the Brazilian economy.

At the meeting with representatives from other ministries that took place at the Foreign Ministry, Marques Porto also mentioned that Brazil needs to have a "group of experts" with a good grasp of the GATT and the EU, a group capable of dealing with issues such as compensatory rights. This would have to be an independent group, free from political pressures, and able to help Brazilian exporters who may be accused of unfair practices and to determine the extent of domestic harm inflicted. Marques Porto added that customs services will have to adjust to GATT's new standards.

Bahia Governor Evaluates Party Alliances

PY0803004294 Sao Paulo FOLHA DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 28 Feb 94 Section 1 p 10

["Exclusive" interview with Bahia State Governor Antonio Carlos Magalhaes by Tales Faria in Salvador; date not given]

[Text] [Faria] How does the pre-electoral picture look to you?

[Magalhaes] I find it quite undefined because there is still only a single known candidate: Lula [Inacio Lula Da Silva] of the PT [Workers Party]. Since he never captures more than one-third of the electorate, it does not seem he will be elected by a majority. The country is trying to find a solution without Lula. But those who think like that have not yet found the road. It is a difficult road to find not only because there are many parties fighting for leadership but also because there are many interests and personal problems.

[Faria] During the national PFL [Liberal Front Party] meeting, part of the party wanted to launch your presidential candidacy. But you found a way to stop it. Why?

[Magalhaes] It would be hasty. First of all, the party must finish its government program. If Brazil is in a bad state of mismanagement, it is up to the PFL to show the country the excessive size of the state and the bad use of public administration. The party can do that even in alliance with other organizations if the essential part of the program we are drawing up is maintained. An alliance in the first round may be the best solution, not only for the party but also for the country. The PFL could make alliances with almost all parties. Any party making alliances should not be prejudiced. It should not exclude anyone.

[Faria] But the noticeable aspect of the PFL national meeting was the great interest in an alliance with the PSDB [Brazilian Social Democracy Party].

[Magalhaes] The truth is local problems have great influence on parties in making alliances. I believe local problems will not hurt an important national alliance. The PSDB is a party that has leaders with whom an alliance is possible. For example, Finance Minister Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Governor Ciro Gomes (Ceara), PSDB President Tasso Jereissati, and party leaders Mario Covas (Senate) and Jose Serra (Chamber of Deputies) are very good men. In the case of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, he obviously has a good image in the media despite the 40 percent monthly inflation rate. I believe if inflation is not defeated, his candidacy will not hold. But if inflation is defeated, he will be a strong presidential candidate in any alliance.

[Faria] Do you believe the minister's economic plan can defeat inflation?

[Magalhaes] That plan is better than nothing, but it will only be good if it is made to last. The truth is that the plan came too late; it should have been presented before. The date 28 February is dangerous because it marks the launching of the Cruzado Plan. The new plan cannot have the false promises of the Cruzado Plan, which became an electoral plan. It must be lasting and aimed at carrying out a profound state reform. But I have confidence that the minister and his economists will not deceive the nation and that they have a good chance to succeed. This is possible because there are now favorable international conditions that did not exist when the Cruzado Plan was implemented.

[Faria] You seem to have some enthusiasm for Cardoso and not for Prefect Paulo Maluf, who advocates an alliance between the PFL and the PPR [Progressive Renewal Party].

[Magalhaes] I have no prejudice about names. I had a meeting with him the other day, and he would not be an obstacle to any kind of contacts. But I do not have to launch his name. I know he has some frictions with the PFL that might or might not disappear, depending on his

work with our party members and on the changes made in Sao Paulo Prefecture. Maluf still has to present an administrative program for Sao Paulo to have the nation trust his reputation as a good administrator. He may succeed if he spends more time on his administration and less on politics.

[Faria] Does an alliance include the PMDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party] of [former Sao Paulo Governor Orestes] Quercia?

[Magalhaes] I do not exclude the PMDB of any other leader. The PMDB currently is very divided and an alliance would be better with leaders that unite. According to what I read, Deputy Antonio Britto (PMDB-RS [Rio Grande do Sul]) is the leader who unites better. But also according to what I read, Britto only plans to run for governor of Rio Grande do Sul. Well, I am not going to get involved in the PMDB's internal affairs. The party leaders can resolve their internal problems, and we will be open to an alliance without excluding any names.

[Faria] The PFL's total opening sometimes causes surprise. Like the contact promoted by PFL Senate leader Marco Maciel (PE [Pernambuco]) with [Rio de Janeiro] Governor Leonel Brizola. I believe an alliance with Brizola is practically impossible.

[Magalhaes] I also believe that. Even with the ability of Senator Marco Maciel, I find it very difficult to reach an alliance. But I would like to reiterate that I am against excluding anyone.

[Faria] In other words, you support the theory of the government leader in the Senate, Pedro Simon (PMDB-RS), that a broad anti-Lula alliance should be made.

[Magalhaes] I am against a special alliance against anything. Brazil does not like the "anti." In Bahia I grew stronger as my adversaries became anti-Magalhaes.

[Faria] What would be your electoral support in that framework?

[Magalhaes] I am only talking about Bahia. My situation in my state is quite reasonable. It is a strong state in the national context with an electorate of 7 million people. I believe the presidential succession will depend on Bahia, and I will do as much as I can to have my party contribute to finding the best solution for Brazil, either with my name in front or somebody else's name. What I want is for the country to come out of the current situation.

[Faria] We are getting into the constitutional amendments. Do you support the reelection of the president and governors, and the reduction of the deadline for a candidate to leave his post to run for another office?

[Magalhaes] I hope to run for a seat in the Senate for Bahia. But if there is reelection, I will be a candidate for governor again with a great chance to win. But I do not believe Congress would approve reelection for the current governors. Regarding the reduction of the deadline to leave a post to run for another office, I would be a hypocrite if I said I oppose it. But I am not fighting for it; I would be satisfied if I had three or four more months to run my state. At any rate, I am getting ready to leave on 30 March. I believe the other governors think the same way.

Disarray, Conflicts Within PT Ranks Surveyed

94SM0258A Sao Paulo ISTOE in Portuguese 16 Feb 94 pp 27-29

[Article: "PT vs. PT," by Jorgemar Felix and Luciano Suassuna]

[Text] Who will govern this country if Luis Inacio Lula da Silva succeeds Itamar Franco? The president, or the PT [Workers Party]? The PT spent more than 72 hours in meetings this week, if you add the hours of meetings of its national executive board in Sao Paulo to gatherings of its federal legislators in Brasilia. The more the PT talks, the more complicated the situation gets. So far, nothing new. The PT spent what seemed to be endless hours debating the main issues faced by the party in its 13 years of existence. The difference this time is the question mark behind the heated debate on the participation of the 36 deputies and Senator Eduardo Suplicy (Sao Paulo) in the constitutional revision and the development of the PT platform. It is a question mark that is eating away at the party and making its candidate for president vulnerable vis-a-vis the bloc of opponents. Such questions leave the party—which began the 1989 election campaign in third place but is now stabilized at the top of the polls—at 30 percent, thus facing the same dilemma as five years ago. Since then, the PT has expelled its more radical faction, the Socialist Convergence, talked to businessmen during meetings lubricated with whisky, and visited military officers. All this without, however, realizing that it was still held prisoner by the radicals. Or, what is worse, the radicals, in order not to appear so, have become indecisive. They are the *tucanos* of the PT.

At the executive board's meeting on Tuesday 8 February, they poked their beaks outside. The date that had been set to decide, finally, whether or not the PT legislators could or could not participate in the constitutional revision assembly ultimately went down in party history as the day of postponement. A party with a profile of firm positions, the PT opted to put off the decision until 17 February. "We chose that date because Lula wants to attend," the coordinator of the party's platform, Prof. Marco Aurelio Garcia, confirmed. In favor of PT participation in the revision, Lula, the party president, had only five of the 20 votes. Fourteen others voted for postponement, and only one is adamantly against the revision. Having caught a bad cold on his fourth caravan trip—this one to Amazonia—Lula was resting at home. While convalescing, he was weakened by another virus: the political agreements virus. Although prevented from

voting on the reform of the Constitution, the PT legislators were able to vote on the Social Emergency Fund (FSE), part of the plan developed by Minister of Finance Fernando Henrique Cardoso. So the PT was not in on the revision, but was voting. This confusion came about because the executive board would not accede to Lula's wishes and those of the majority of its congressmen and senators. Nor would Lula accept the executive board's radical posture. So the candidate sent a message to the board, which was meeting at the Hotel Comodoro in Sao Paulo, asking for them to postpone everything until the 17th, the eve of the start of yet another caravan trip, this one to the South. Garcia does not agree that in that discussion on the FES things were all that simple. "Even I, who is considered soft [preceding word in English]—I did not think they should vote," he said. "But that will be resolved next week."

Until then, the legislators, the executive board, and Lula are locked in an arm-wrestling contest. The "it" in this dispute that resembles a game of blindman's buff is Lula's candidacy, which urgently needs alliances and a platform to guide it to victory. "There are two distinct roads the PT can take," suggests Sao Paulo Deputy Jose Genoino. "It could expand its alliances with a platform that does not create obstacles to shut out other parties or keep it from governing; or else decide that Lula will govern merely by mobilizing the public." The second hypothesis Genoino considers to be a mistake. In this arm-wrestling phase, the executive board was clever when it opted for a confrontation with the party's legislators instead of trying to force the adoption of a platform as happened in other elections. By attacking the deputies, the factions on the left, which have representatives on the executive board, played games with people's vanity. Another strategy used by the radical is an older one—uniting the other schools of thought. Or uniting dissenters from those groups, like the Hour of Truth, the most leftist part of Articulation, which is Lula's faction. The Hour of Truth was against PT participation in the revision. "The attack on the delegation was reinforced by the anticongressional sentiments of the PT rank and file—sentiments shared by the general public," a party congressman revealed.

Seven legislators drafted a manifesto and accepted the decision of the radicals. Ten others remained on the fence. The majority threatened to break with the executive board. From Belem, Lula tried to put the house in order. He sent (in different words) the following message: those who are dissatisfied had better leave. The party president accepted the position taken by the executive board and was insisting that the legislators do the same. The 19 rebels then began to negotiate. At the meeting with the executive board in Sao Paulo, the leader of the legislative delegation, Jose Fortunati (Rio Grande do Sul), withstood the fire from the radicals. The payback came out of the meeting of the delegation on Tuesday 8 February. The deputies accepted the order to obstruct the revision, but would disobey the ban on voting, provided they do so as a tactic of obstruction.

"That is not much," complained Deputy Joao Paulo (Minas Gerais).

"Calm down, Joao Paulo"—asked his colleague Pedro Tonelli (Parana)—"the executive board did not realize that if you give us an inch, we can take a mile."

That same evening, the PT deputies voted against Minister Fernando Henrique's plan. But they did vote. As the legislators see it, Lula let the conflict go on because he is holding back an argument in his favor in order to negotiate later on, in what will be the most important negotiations. In April, the Ninth National Encounter will decide, among other things, the policy on alliances. Lula needs to shove the *tucanos*, beaks and all, down the throats of the radicals who are in the PT leadership. In other words, to do a kindness today so as to win tomorrow. Lula is counting on some factors in his favor, such as the good will of PSDB President Tasso Jereissati and the almost-discarded candidacy of the finance minister. The slate may also include the PSB [Brazilian Socialist Party], with which the PT has already reached an agreement, and the PC do B [Communist Party of Brazil]. What we do not know is how the most radical wing, the unrelenting opponent of alliances (especially with social democratic parties) will behave when this subject is on the table. Or whether Lula will be able to convince them as easily as he expects. His leadership is also being tested on platform issues such as the foreign debt, anti-inflationary policy, and the military budget. Depending on the degree of radicalism that prevails at the April meeting, his candidacy could either be consolidated or weakened.

These differences, Garcia admits, are wearing down the party and opening a breach through which opponents can attack. "The disagreements are being mishandled and are certainly hurting the campaign," said the professor, now one of Lula's most influential advisers. Garcia emphasizes, however, that those discussions are about programs. "No one in the PT is obliged to furnish an auditor's report to prove he can be a candidate; in this party, the debate is about ideas," he boasted. That is precisely one of the questions in the voters' minds: who will prevail, the man, or the ideas? "Lula is bigger," Garcia answered. Even while extolling the differences and their content, Garcia admits that the controversy about the revision will leave scars even among those "colleagues," who, until then, worked closely together. On Tuesday 8 February, he himself became irritated with Jose Genoino. The deputy, reacting to pressure from the executive board, had attacked the PT platform which, the legislator complained, "worships the State." As mentor of the text that will be voted on in April, Garcia was furious. "Look, why didn't he pick up the telephone and tell me so, why didn't he ask for a meeting to tell me what he thinks?" he asked. "They use their access to the press to call the executive board bureaucratic, to attack this or that, but I could play that game too if I wanted and it would be pure nitroglycerine, because I have all the documents," he threatened. Among the closest advisors are some who argued on

Wednesday 9 February that Lula should take a hard line toward all this squabbling. "It is time for him to blow the whistle," said one of them. In the afternoon of that same day, during an interview in Sao Jose dos Campos (Sao Paulo), Lula was still mild-mannered in his comments, despite urging autonomy for the legislative delegation.

No one expects the members of a big party to hold identical opinions. That does not happen anywhere in the world. "People should look at the cost-benefit ratio of all this, and consider whether it helps the party or helps X, Y, or Z," Garcia observed. Anyone who is working on Lula's image in the business community would be the first to close out the balance sheet in the red. "The party is going through a divisive phase; Lula is a negotiator and will certainly put an end to this, said businessman Oded Grajew, one of the people in charge of setting up meetings between Lula and representatives of business. Grajew, a former president of the Brazilian Association of Toy Manufacturers (Abrinq), recalls that he has often been forced to yield or accept defeat. "A president can be neither a dictator nor a puppet," he advises.

[Box p 28]

Preaching to the Choir—Professor Analyzes Style of PT Documents

No Brazilian political party produces more documents than the PT. There are folders stuffed with papers—directives, programs, proposals, opinions, press releases, and so on. The *petistas* write as much as they debate in interminable meetings. And every meeting of its directors or officers ends up in written form. One of these papers, specifically the "Directives For the State Government Platform of the Sao Paulo PT" ended up in the hands of Maria Otilia Bocchini, a professor at the School of Communications and Arts at the University of Sao Paulo (USP). A scholar and expert on social linguistics, she made a surprising discovery. The party writes plenty, but the voter understands very little of it. "The texts are not clear, they are written only for the initiated," she observed. Herself a card-carrying *petista*, Maria Otilia decided to suggest some changes to the PT editors. And she did so in a very original manner: she put it in the form of a document.

With good-humored language, she extracted some "pearls" from the platform adopted by PT candidate for governor Jose Dirceu. On two sheets of paper, under the title "The PT Way To Write Documents," she listed, under 11 topics, the flaws and examples of stodginess she found in party language. Using sarcasm, Maria Otilia's 11 commandments prescribe exactly what should not be done when writing for the "masses"—since that is the party's intended audience. "That was the method I chose to call more attention to the defects," she argues. In the third commandment, "Use a tangle of idle chatter, choose words and expressions whose meanings are elastic, vague, and imprecise," she suggested a simpler text for the title of the document. "PT Objectives in the 1994 elections: elect Lula president and win the governor's mansion." Compare this with what the *petistas* preferred: "In 1994, the Brazilian people will have an historic opportunity to inflict, via the ballot box, a strategic defeat on the dominant sectors of society."

According to Maria Otilia, *petistas* "preach to the choir, repeat themselves, use obscure expressions and titles, and conceal their thoughts behind difficult words." Evidence of this last observation can be found in the latest document from the PT oven. On 8 February, the party put out a press release entitled "PT Continues Its Obstruction" about the party's participation in the constitutional revision. In other words, after two days of debate, the PT released an ambiguous paper over its internal division. In it, the executive board confirms its position against the revision, but speaks of a "maximum agenda" and actually postpones the final decision until 17 February. The fear of appearing to have a limited vocabulary is the principal cause of this frustrated attempt at sophistication in language. Or perhaps they prefer to complicate things so no one really will understand them.

[Boxed quotes, page 29]

Who Gives Orders To Whom—Will Lula Be Able To Impose His Will, or Will He Be Led Around By the Party?

- *Esperidiao Amim, senator, PPR-SC [Progressive Renewal Party, Santa Catarina]*: "There are so many internal splits that no one can tell anyone else what to do. The end result is zero."
- *Jose Genoino, PT deputy from Sao Paulo*: "I am afraid the radicals will botch Lula's campaign. They have really hurt the PT."
- *Jose Paulo Bisol, PSB senator from Rio Grande do Sul*: "There are both utopian groups and forces worried about governability. That sparks conflicts within the party."
- *Luiz Gushiken, PT deputy from Sao Paulo*: "As president, Lula will be bigger than the PT because his electorate will exceed the boundaries of the party."

Correction to President Completes Cabinet Reshuffling

PY0403212194

The following correcting pertains to the item headlined "President Franco Completes Cabinet Reshuffling," published in the 3 March Latin America DAILY REPORT, page 18:

Column one, paragraph two, only sentence, make read: ...maintain acting Minister Leonor Franco as head of the Social Welfare Ministry, and acting Minister Djalma Moraes as head of...(correcting spelling of names)

Chile

No Decision Yet on Buying Mirage-5 Fighters

PY0803032294 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2338 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Santiago, 7 Mar (EFE)—The Chilean Air Force (FACh) commander, General Ramon Vega, today explained that this institution still has not decided whether it will purchase Mirage-5 fighters from Brussels as reported by the media.

The new acquisitions fall within an overall plan to modernize the Chilean Armed Forces' equipment, and in the FACh's case they are to replace the old Hawker Hunter fighters and other aircraft.

Gen. Vega said there is still nothing definite about the purchase of Mirage fighters, although he admitted "it is a possibility the FACh is assessing."

Vega made this statement after a ceremony in which he received a Spanish-made CASA transportation aircraft, model C-212, the first of a group of six to replace the Twin Otter aircraft that operate in southern Chile.

Center Center Union To Merge With National Party

PY0803011894 Santiago LA TERCERA DE LA HORA in Spanish 20 Feb 94 p 15

[Article by Patricia Bravo]

[Excerpt] The Center Center Union (UCC) general assembly, with the approval of 80 percent of those present, decided to merge with the National Party (PN).

At the end of the event, UCC President Carlos del Campo said: "We hope to materialize a new political party of national interest." Del Campo met with the media accompanied by PN President Enrique Schilling, who attended the assembly in his capacity as a guest.

The two politicians agreed on the principles that unite their respective parties, and voiced their pleasure with the request by a group of independent liberals headed by Luis Claro Lagarrigue to join the new group. [passage omitted]

Colombia

Polls Show Candidates Samper, Pastrana Tied

PA0703194194 Santa Fe de Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 1 in Spanish 1730 GMT 7 Mar 94

[From the "National Newscast"]

[Text] Ernesto Samper and Andres Pastrana are tied in their bid for the Presidency of the Republic. According to the latest poll by the National Consulting Center, the two candidates, who lead the surveys, are still neck and neck for the first and second round of elections.

Samper and Pastrana are advancing neck and neck in their quest for the Presidency. For the first time in history, no bets can be made for either candidate in the electoral process. The polls have revealed such a small difference that it can be said technically they are tied.

Figures speak for themselves. For the first electoral round Samper obtained 38 percent of the support over 37 percent for Pastrana; forty-five percent of those polled in the second round have said they would vote for Andres Pastrana and 44 percent for Ernesto Samper.

Regardless of from where it comes, the opinion sector or the campaign team, the fact of the matter is in May each vote will be decisive. There are eight weeks before the election, however, and the result of the consultation within the Liberal Party and the reallocation of forces after the legislative elections can change things substantially.

Pastrana Discusses Economic, Narcotics Policy

94SM0242A Santa Fe de Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 13 Feb 94 p 11A

[Interview with Conservative Party presidential candidate Andres Pastrana, 11 February, in Bogota, by Maria Teresa Ronderos and Jorge Gonzalez]

[Excerpts] Twelve hours after presenting his platform at a hectic and colorful session in the Convention Center, Andres Pastrana still seemed very animated.

Since 0600 on Friday he had been taking calls from radio stations and at the request of one of them, he exchanged greetings with Samper, responding with a "very good, my dear Ernesto," to a somewhat cool "well, how did it go?"

Then he met with journalists from EL TIEMPO in his apartment where, accompanied by Luis Alberto Moreno, his campaign coordinator, and Jaime Ruiz, his issues adviser, he was getting ready to begin his first campaign trip through Antioquia.

[EL TIEMPO] You have urged Ernesto Samper to challenge your ideas. You told him that neither your father nor your moustache are issues for debate. What might be the major conceptual differences between the proposals you made on Thursday and Samper's?

[Pastrana] I presented a platform in which I say not only what I am going to do but how I am going to do it, where we will get the resources, and on what areas our seven priorities are going to focus. The program is backed by solid work and supported by a reliable team. Our proposals are specific and they in no way are the result of improvization.

I find contradictions in Dr. Samper's ideas. I agree with Dr. De la Calle that Samper changes his mind a lot. For

example, I have always believed in the "apertura" [trade liberalization] and I have always opposed legalizing drugs. I do not know if Samper agrees or does not agree with me this week. [passage omitted]

[EL TIEMPO] You say that there are strong similarities between you and President Gaviria. How does your platform differ from what he has done?

[Pastrana] I agree with his economic approach. He laid the foundation and now we have to build the structure. The difference is that I am calling for a strong social investment. I will base this on an education policy that ensures that not a single child will not go to school. Education will give us what we need so that we, the Colombian people, can begin to compete in international markets. We are going to generate the infrastructure required for modern development. We will have roads, efficient communications, and ports. We plan to create a revolution in water, not only to ensure 90 percent coverage in providing service, but also to promote its appropriate use in agrarian development. We have already calculated the resources needed. [passage omitted]

[EL TIEMPO] People recognize the effort you have made to be independent of your father. But there are some issues, like international policy, on which when you speak it seems as if Misael and not Andres were speaking....

[Pastrana] One thing needs to be understood: few times in political history has a former president seen that his son might reach the presidency. I imagine that would not be easy to deal with. At least not for a man with the character and temperament of Misael Pastrana, a person who likes to express his opinions, who fights openly for his party and for his ideas.

On international policy, we have a very important group of people who are truly knowledgeable about these issues. If there is one thing on which I agree with my father, it is that international policy should not be handled in isolation by one party.

[EL TIEMPO] But in this area some of your father's proposals belong more to a nationalism of a bygone era.

[Pastrana] Are we perhaps talking about the *marines*? Fine, we can do that. If there really are troop movements, the president has to make the issues clear. The government has said that it failed to provide information. It is still possible to convene the Advisory Commission on Relations to help clear up unknown factors.

Since I am on this issue, here is another difference between myself and Samper. During my government I will bring in foreign advisers to help coordinate the campaign against narcoterrorism. He said he would not do that; he does not know that we need strong methods to fight this scourge.

In this field, I have developed my own policy, my own contacts. I chaired an organization of 16 Latin American parties. I have ties of friendship with President Caldera and his family, and also with President Frei of Chile. I am a friend and I went to school with President Figueres of Costa Rica. We have excellent relations with President Cristiani. I also have excellent contacts in Europe. That will allow us to consolidate the integration process, going beyond international treaties. We have already promoted our own course of action, which is very much my own.

[EL TIEMPO] Your family has a high political profile. Your father is a former president. Your brother is the editor of a militant opposition newspaper. Do you share the view that your family may become your Achilles heel?

[Pastrana] The Pastranas, as my brother Juan Carlos said, are a family and not a herd, so everyone will continue to pursue the activities to which he has devoted himself so far, with mutual respect and independence. I have never considered my family my Achilles heel, but I must say that I now fear LA PRENSA's headlines. [passage omitted]

[EL TIEMPO] Now that Escobar and the myth of the Medellin Cartel are dead, what would you do about the Cali Cartel?

[Pastrana] I have been quite clear about the need to curb the drug traffic and not to legalize the production, sale, and consumption of drugs. We are going to revise our antidrug strategies to make them more effective. I have not been informed about the negotiations with the Cali Cartel. I support them as long as they are in compliance with the law and the policy of bringing criminals to justice. I do not accept and will not accept the policy of house arrest. That is ridiculous; it would be shameful. What is needed is severe punishment, not a reward.

[EL TIEMPO] The possibility that drug traffickers may end up with ridiculously small penalties is of great concern to the United States. They demand that the punishment be proportional to the crime. Do you think that fear is reasonable?

[Pastrana] Why do they not apply that approach in their country? Carlos Lehder was sentenced to life in prison plus 100 years. Now, according to what we have heard, he was transferred to German jail and given special privileges after negotiations. When I was in Washington in 1990 I proposed that we pursue a policy similar to *plea bargaining*; the press jumped all over me and asked me why I was suggesting such an idea. "Why are you so upset? That is your system, we are going to copy it," I answered. And we have copied it, to such an extent that the first legislation was issued by decree. What was wrong with that? That we might negotiate in search of peace? But when the drug lords sought through extradition went [to the United States] and got the "perks" of *plea bargaining* by turning in other people, that was not criticized.

I agree that we need to seek a fair sentence from the legal point of view. I insist that penalties must be served in prison. The policy of bringing criminals to justice must be consistent.

[EL TIEMPO] You have announced that you will not accept campaign contributions from the Santo Domingo Group. Does this mean your government would pursue an energetic policy of controlling concentrations of wealth?

[Pastrana] As they should be, my campaign books are open to anyone who wants to see them in the Treasury Inspector's Office. A policy needs to be developed to protect citizens from abuses by private and public enterprises that take advantage of their dominant position. Another very important issue is regulating lobbying and political campaign financing.

The regulation of the monopoly system concerns me, especially as it relates to the Television Law. I believe we have been lax because the government has run the television system. If we want to protect the citizens' right to be well informed, we can not continue to be so lax. Furthermore, regional autonomy will not become a reality without excellent territorial legislation. We need to strengthen and pay attention to the commission created by the 1991 Charter. The truth is that the bill now pending in Congress is very weak.

Opposes Oil Sales to Cuba

PA0703213294 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1558 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Santa Fe de Bogota, 7 Mar (EFE)—Conservative presidential hopeful Andres Pastrana today criticized the government's decision to establish commercial relations with Cuba without first demanding a pronouncement by Cuban President Fidel Castro condemning the Colombian guerrillas.

Pastrana noted that Castro has not made any pledges to Colombia, and he added that in order to strengthen commercial relations, which were interrupted more than a decade ago because of Cuban support for the Colombian guerrillas, the Cuban leader must clarify his relationship with the guerrillas.

The presidential hopeful recalled that the top leader of the Army of National Liberation—the former Spanish priest Manuel Perez—has repeatedly said his movement is Cuba's mouthpiece in Colombia, and this, in turn, requires that Castro make a statement. Speaking in the town of Rioacha, Guajira, Pastrana said the resumption of commercial relations harms Colombia more than it benefits Cuba.

"As everybody knows, a boycott of Colombian products in the United States has been announced," the conservative hopeful indicated.

Last week, after the Colombian Government announced it will sell 20,000 barrels of oil a day to Cuba, the decision prompted a strong reaction among Cuban exiles in Miami, who have launched a campaign in the United States against the purchase of Colombian products.

Armed Forces Implement Security Plan

PA0403214594 Santa Fe de Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 26 Feb 94 p 11a

[Text] It has been reported that 100,000 Armed Forces members will implement the Democracy Plan, which seeks to ensure that the country's coming electoral activities will be held normally and peacefully. Administrative Department of Security [DAS] members will also participate in the plan, which has been coordinated by the Defense Ministry.

The Democracy Plan consists of three main facets: security of candidates, security at the voting sites, and security of National Civil Registry Office members, not only during the elections but during the vote counting and the transportation of ballot boxes as well.

General Celso Suarez, the Armed Forces General Command's chief of operations, has told EL TIEMPO: "In most of the cases, the police will protect the ballot boxes, and the Navy and the Air Force will be in charge of protecting the general area surrounding the voting sites."

Although no area in the country will be left unprotected, there will be priorities, according to the Defense Ministry. In the Uraba zone in Antioquia and Choco Departments alone, 8,000 Armed Forces members will guarantee normalcy before, during, and after the elections, Defense Minister Rafael Pardo Rueda has reported. Pardo visited the area this week with high-ranking Army and police officers and registry official Luis Camilo Osorio.

EL TIEMPO has learned that the Armed Forces have decided to give special attention to the Santander, Boyaca, Cesar, Magdalena, and Meta Departments. The strategy adopted by the police and DAS establishes protection of the candidates, political centers, patrolling, and making available bomb squads and investigation squads.

The candidates' protection includes making sure the candidates for president follow the instructions issued by their security chiefs and escorts. In theory, all candidates to public positions can have official escorts. The large number of candidates makes this difficult, however. For the time being, the Defense Ministry is trying to establish who really requires protection and determine priorities in the movement of escorts.

Suarez said: "The Public Force has offered the highest security possible to those who request it. We must mention that we are inviting all candidates to regional and municipal security committees to present their concerns and needs."

The high-level official confirmed consultations with the candidates had facilitated the study in each case to

recommend the respective security measures. He also admitted that the military forces are analyzing the possibility of candidates' avoiding travel in certain areas of the nation with public order problems.

When making reference to this week's attacks and kidnappings as part of the guerrillas' plan to hamper the electoral process, Suarez said that even though kidnapping and murder have become a profession for the rebels, neither the citizens nor the political class have been intimidated.

He also responded to criticism according to which the Democratic Plan is only a transitory reaction that does not solve the true problem of the rebels. The officer said that the plan is not new. Nevertheless, he added, it goes without saying that "any person or group that tries to alter or hamper the normal development of the elections will be the object of a timely reaction by the Public Forces."

According to military sources, the deployment of personnel to implement the Democratic Plan should not in any way hamper the development of offensive operations against the guerrillas throughout the nation. "It is important to highlight that this plan will be implemented without impairing the counterinsurgency offensive. Currently we have the capability to handle both fronts appropriately," Suarez noted.

Irregularities Among Prosecutors Investigated

94SM0225A Santa Fe de Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 23 Jan 94 p 23

[Text] A prosecutor obtains an arrest warrant against a mayor upon finding a 15,000-peso discrepancy in an account, and another charges a widow with homicide solely because she did not attend her husband's funeral.

A special prosecutor demands money from the potential targets of his investigation, and others do not attend court proceedings and later allow court orders to be falsified.

Investigations and arrests are overturned because of inconsistencies, as in Adelina Mesa's case, who was accused of a terrorist attack in Bogota, and prosecutors are blamed for inconsistencies in a number of cases.

All these episodes seem to have finally exhausted the patience of Attorney General Carlos Gustavo Arrieta. His staff is now handling 1,200 investigations of prosecutors. In a letter to Prosecutor General Gustavo de Greiff, he revealed the system's Achilles heel: arbitrary actions and negligence on the part of a number of prosecutors.

Arrieta issued a forceful criticism: some prosecutors initiate legal action hastily and without solid evidence, thereby violating the principle of [presumed] innocence and due process.

In his letter, the attorney general announced the immediate start of new investigations because these abuses still persist, even though in May 1993 he had issued warnings concerning these abuses, also in a letter to the prosecutor general.

De Greiff agrees that there are serious irregularities in the work of some of his subordinates, but says they do not reach the extreme cited by the Attorney General's Office.

"We," De Greiff told EL TIEMPO, "do not conceal anything from a sense of esprit de corps; we do not protect people because they are in the Prosecutor General's Office. We are not saints, but we try to be."

During his 18 months at the Prosecutor General's Office, De Greiff has investigated 656 prosecutors in internal procedures. To date 238 investigations have been concluded; 418 are still under way.

Director of Prosecution Offices

The National Director of Prosecution Offices, Ana Montes, who coordinates prosecutors all over the country and whose office maintains statistics on decisions issued by prosecutors acting as trial judges, has her own view of the matter.

Montes agrees that "it is time to look at what is going on," but she explains that many of the complaints are filed when the party affected by a decision calls for a disciplinary or penal investigation against the prosecutor.

Still, the Attorney General's Office believes that the problem goes far beyond that. As an example, they say that prosecutors have been initiating legal proceedings against municipal officials who in the end prove their innocence.

"On many occasions ignorance of administrative contracting provisions and regulations or of budget systems has caused legal action to be initiated and municipal officials to be suspended who later (...) must be returned to office."

"All this," explains the attorney general, "could be avoided if prosecutors studied the situation thoroughly before initiating legal proceedings."

However, De Greiff and Arrieta both seem to agree that the time has come to apply a firm hand.

Details of Fabio Ochoa's Confession Reported

94WD0225Z Santa Fe de Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 7 Feb 94 p 16A

[Article by Camilo Chaparro]

[Text] A week before Juan David Ochoa Vasquez is to work out a settlement with the Prosecutor General's Office, EL TIEMPO obtained exclusive access to Fabio Ochoa Vasquez's confession.

In this confession the youngest of the Ochoa Vasquez brothers gave the Prosecutor General's Office new details on how the Medellin drug traffickers operated.

Ochoa's statement revealed routes, the *modus operandi*, drug destinations, money laundering, and their ties with the owners of "Tranquilandia."

Based on this confession, which was supported and confirmed by testimony from two other drug traffickers who have confessed, Jaime Mejia Sanin and Jorge Luis Ochoa Vasquez, and by statements given to U.S. Justice Department officials by Max Mermelstein and Carlos Lehder, the state on 20 December 1993 sentenced Fabio Ochoa to eight and one-half years in prison, without reductions.

As an example, Mermelstein—considered one of the Medellin Cartel's principal contacts in the United States—said that between 1981 and 1983 he worked with the cartel and helped bring 56 tons of cocaine to the United States.

Speaking of the youngest of the Ochoa brothers involved in drug trafficking, Mermelstein said he first met him in 1978 and received from him "a kilo of cocaine in Miami; later he [Ochoa] showed me another 100 kilos in an apartment."

He added that on a number of occasions he met with members of the Medellin Cartel—among whom he mentioned Fabio Ochoa—in Panama, Miami, and the capital of Antioquia, to discuss drug trafficking deals. He also said he had visited the "Tranquilandia" lab, set up by the cartel between 1983 and 1984 in the Yari forests (Caqueta department).

The "Stake" System

Fabio Ochoa confessed to being involved in drug trafficking for 16 years, starting in 1974 and leaving the business, he said, in mid-1990, when he turned himself in.

Ochoa's testimony, obtained exclusively by EL TIEMPO, says that "he primarily sold drugs, periodically exporting varying amounts of cocaine, which increased over time, to the United States."

According to this confessed trafficker, his first shipment consisted of a half kilo of drugs; over the years he sent tons of drugs to the United States.

Of these amounts, Ochoa said that only part belonged to him, as they were sent through a system the drug traffickers called "a stake," meaning that the shipment did not come from a single person, but from several people.

Although Ochoa gave details on some of the shipments, the Prosecutor General's Office and the special judge of Medellin, who endorsed the settlement between the state and this criminal, said that because of the passage of time and the informal and clandestine way in which those operations were conducted, no further information is available on each of the drug shipments in which the youngest of the Ochoa clan participated.

Ochoa said that in 1988 he participated "as a stakeholder in shipping cocaine to the United States." The special Medellin judge revealed in his sentence that the cocaine was shipped on a route that started in Bolivia and went through Argentina.

On this shipment, the document reveals that Ochoa faked the import of salted anchovies to New York to conceal 1,124 kilos of cocaine.

In late 1989 and early 1990, he was also involved in sending cocaine to Spain, but the final destination of this shipment was the United States.

The youngest of the Ochoa family, the first of the family to turn himself in, also confessed to the crime of conspiring to commit a crime, as he set up and ran a drug trafficking organization.

Failure in Darien

He also stated that there were links with some drug processing labs and that he had lent approximately $250,000 to the owners of "Tranquilandia," possibly so they would complete the construction of that laboratory in the Colombian forests.

Ochoa added that they paid that money back with "cheaper and better quality merchandise."

In 1984, according to his confession, he again provided money to finance a large drug processing lab in the Darien region near the Panamanian border, but according to Ochoa, this facility never operated because it was discovered by the authorities.

According to Ochoa, on "one occasion in 1986, he rented land and had a runway developed near the banks of the Middle Magdalena River. This runway was to be used for transporting drugs."

This clandestine runway, he added, was a failure because it was in an area with strong guerrilla influence.

The drug trafficker also confessed to illicit enrichment, "acquiring horses, livestock, cars, and ranches." These assets came to an approximate total value of $2 million. "He is prepared to turn over the equivalent of this amount, since this property has been converted into other assets, both personal and real estate property," said the special judge in confirming the negotiated settlement reached between the Prosecutor General's Office and the accused.

Ochoa also confessed that he had used various persons from his organization in financial and commercial operations to launder the dollars he received from drug trafficking. These operations took place in Panama and in Medellin.

Paraguay

Colorado Party Appeals Party Elections Results

PY0503175094 Asuncion ULTIMA HORA in Spanish 4 Mar 94 p 13

[Text] Today lawyer Jaime Jose Bestard, acting on behalf of the Colorado Reconciliation Movement, a faction of the Colorado Party, submitted to the Supreme Court a great number of documents on the Colorado Party elections, which were held on 27 December 1992. These documents could allegedly prove that the current administration of President Juan Carlos Wasmosy is illegitimate. Luis Maria Argana, the leader of the faction, also was present at the Supreme Court when the presentation was made.

The Supreme Court received five thick binders which contain 5,000 notarized photocopies of electoral records from the capital, Concepcion, San Pedro, Cordillera, Guaira, Caaguazu, Caazapa, Itaugua, Itapua, Misiones, Paraguari and Alto Parana. The records bear the signatures of the presidents, vice presidents, and faction representatives of each voting station.

The plea states: "These documents clearly show the true results of the Colorado Party elections held on 27 December 1992."

According to the plea, the total vote count yields the following result: Ticket No. 4 [Argana] 215,764 votes; Ticket No. 2 [Wasmosy] 188,949 votes, which means that the Colorado Reconciliation Movement won the elections by 26,815.

It is explained that only the vote counts for presidential and vice presidential candidates are being objected to as unconstitutional, not the vote count for senators and deputies.

The plea emphasizes that "it is aimed at laying bare this monstrous fraud and paving the way for the appropriate criminal lawsuit and claims for damages against the people involved."

Correction to Wasmosy State of Nation Address

PY0403135494

The following corrections pertain to the item headlined "Wasmosy Gives State of Nation Address," published in the 4 March Latin America DAILY REPORT, pages 30-41:

Page 39, column two, first paragraph, last sentence make read...the Tiete-Parana waterway. [new graf]

Following a virtual...(correcting word).

Page 40, column two, second paragraph, only sentence make read...ambitious objectives that we are pursuing....(adding dropped word).

Venezuela

PRC Deputy Foreign Minister Arrives on Visit

PA0703194494 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 2153 GMT 6 Mar 94

[Text] Caracas, 6 Mar (DPA)—Liu Huaqiu, PRC deputy foreign minister, arrived in Caracas today for a three-day visit to meet with Foreign Ministry officials and President Rafael Caldera.

The PRC diplomatic representative will participate in meetings through the political consultation mechanism at the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry on Monday, and he will meet with Venezuelan Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas. Following these meetings Liu Huaqiu will meet with the board of directors of the Venezuelan Congress and Rafael Caldera at Miraflores Palace. On Tuesday he will participate in the installation of the Venezuelan-Chinese Chamber of Commerce.

The PRC deputy foreign minister will leave Caracas on Tuesday and continue on to Santiago, Chile, as part of his tour of Latin America. Those accompanying the PRC deputy foreign minister during his tour are: Li Gouxin, director general of Latin American Affairs, and secretaries Hu Dingxian, Zhao Rongxian, and He Ruipeng.

PRC Visitor Discusses Trade Relations

PA0803021894 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 2104 GMT 7 Mar 94

[Text] Caracas, 7 Mar (DPA)—Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqui said here today that China places great importance on strengthening its relations with developing countries such as Venezuela. Liu Huaqui is on an official visit to Caracas and will travel to Santiago de Chile tomorrow.

Our country advocates an independent peace policy as a basis for its foreign policy, the ranking diplomat of the People's Republic of China stated, reiterating that these objectives will be strengthened in its ties with Venezuela.

Relations between Beijing and Caracas will be boosted soon with "high-level visits" and increased bilateral economic cooperation.

After meeting with Roy Chaderton, his Venezuelan counterpart, and establishing the political Chinese-Venezuelan consultation mechanisms, Liu plans to meet with President Rafael Caldera and Foreign Minister Miguel Burelli Rivas. He will also preside over the installation of a binational trade commission.

Trade between the two countries was close to $100 million in 1993; the main products traded were iron, chemicals, textiles, and home electrical appliances, according to figures from the Chinese Embassy in Caracas. According to the same source, China increased its imports from Venezuela by 200 percent last year.